Supplementary Appendix: Experiment Instructions & Questionnaire

Instructions – Task I

This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision making. The University of Hong Kong has provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is Hong Kong Dollars. At the end of today’s session, you will be paid in private and in cash.

It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand but do not say anything, and an experimenter will come to you and will answer your question or provide assistance in private. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.

The experiment is divided into five tasks. We are now reading the instructions for Task I, and instructions for the other tasks will be made available later. The 12 participants in today’s experiment will be randomly split into two equal-sized, 6-person clusters, a Gamma cluster and a Delta cluster. Individuals in a particular cluster will not interact with those from the other cluster. The 6 participants in each cluster will then be randomly split into two equal-sized, 3-person groups, a Square group and a Circle group. That is, the computer will randomly assign a participant into the role of either a Gamma-Square decision maker, a Gamma-Circle decision maker, a Delta-Circle decision maker, or a Delta-Square decision maker. This cluster-group assignment will remain unchanged throughout the whole experiment. You will not know the identity of the participants you interact with in any task of the experiment.

Your Choice in Task I

During Task I of the experiment you will interact with the other two participants in your cluster-group, and will make one decision. For example, if you are a Gamma-Circle decision maker, you will interact with the other two Gamma-Circle decision makers.

In particular, you will select a number denoted by X. The values of X you may choose are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. The value you pick for X and the minimum value of X chosen by all three members in your cluster-group (including yourself) will determine your payoff in Task I of the experiment.
## Task I
Subject ID: Gamma Circle 3
You are interacting with the other 2 Gamma Circles

### Figure 1: Decision Screen for Task I

**Minimun Value of X Chosen by all 3 Gamma Circles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>$12.00</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$10.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time Remaining = 197**

- Gamma Circle 1's INITIAL PROPOSAL: 7
- Gamma Circle 2's INITIAL PROPOSAL: 3
- Gamma Circle 3's INITIAL PROPOSAL: 2

- Gamma Circle 2: 1 live oranges
- Gamma Circle 2: 1 live apples
- Gamma Circle 1: 1 live bananas
The decision screen in Figure 1 indicates how your earnings for this task are determined by your choice and the choices of others. The entries in the table on the left give each participant’s earnings in dollars from selecting alternative values of X. The earnings in Task I may be found by looking across from the value you choose on the left-hand side of the table, and down from the minimum value chosen from the top of the table. For example, if you chose a 4 and the minimum value chosen was a 3, you earn $12.00 in Task I. Alternatively, if you chose 4 and the minimum value of X chosen was 4, then you earn $15.00. Note that all three participants (including you) have the same payoff table.

Before making their actual choice, the three participants who are from the same cluster-group have an opportunity to privately communicate with each other. Before this communication phase begins, you will input proposals for your choice of X. This is your initial proposal only, and you are free to choose whatever choice of X you prefer when you make the actual decision for X after the communication phase is over.

After all three participants click “Submit,” all three proposals will be shown on the three participants’ screens. At this point, you will be able to chat for 2 minutes in a chat window. Participants will communicate in English only. Although we will record the messages that you send, only you and the other two persons in your cluster-group will see them. When a participant sends a message to other participants, the program will display the cluster-group-ID number of the sender. For example, the chat window on the right of Figure 1 illustrates the display of this cluster-group-ID number for Gamma-Circle-1, Gamma-Circle-2, and Gamma-Circle-3. This cluster-group-ID number is randomly assigned and will remain unchanged throughout all tasks in the experiment. We request that you follow two simple rules in sending messages: (1) Be civil to each other and use no profanity and (2) Do not identify yourself.

After the chat period is over, an “input box” will appear to allow you to enter your choice of X. When you are ready to make your choice, click “Submit”. Note that you do not know the other two participants’ choices of X when you make your selection.

After all decisions have been made, the computer will determine the minimum value of X chosen in your group, and will determine your earnings. All this information will be displayed on the outcome screen.
Summing up, the following will occur in Task I:

1. You will be randomly assigned a cluster-group-ID and this will be your cluster-group-ID throughout the whole experiment. You will never interact with any decision maker from another cluster. You will not know the identities of the participants you interact with in any tasks of the experiment.

2. You will be asked to enter your choice of X for Task I of the experiment. Before you make your decision, you and the other two participants who are from your cluster-group have an opportunity to make initial proposals and privately communicate with each other for 2 minutes in a chat window. After the chat period is over, you make your decision without knowing the other two participants’ choices of X.

3. After all participants make their decisions, the computer will display the minimum value of X chosen in your group, and will determine your earnings for Task I.

Before we begin Task I you will take a short quiz on your computer to verify your understanding of these instructions for Task I. Please feel free to refer to the instructions as you answer the quiz questions. The computer will record how many quiz questions you answer correctly, and you will be paid $2 for each correct answer.

Are there any questions?
Computerized Quiz for Task I

Please note: The following examples were chosen randomly and are not meant to be suggestive. You will be paid $2 for each correct answer.

1. If you are randomly assigned as a Delta-Square decision maker, then you will be a Delta-Square decision maker throughout the whole experiment (circle one): TRUE     FALSE
   Answer: TRUE. According to the instructions, the randomly determined cluster-group assignment will remain unchanged throughout the whole experiment.

2. If you are randomly assigned as a Gamma-Circle decision maker in the Gamma cluster, then you will interact with a Delta-Circle decision maker from the Delta cluster at some point of this experiment (circle one): TRUE     FALSE
   Answer: FALSE. The instructions state that “Individuals in these two clusters will never interact with each other.”

3. Suppose the minimum chosen by all three participants in your group is 4 and you choose 6. What would your earnings be in this case? Use the table shown in Figure 1 to find your earnings.
   Answer: $12.00. Your earnings would be $12.00. Find the column that says “4” for the minimum chosen by the group. Now find the row that says “6” for your choice. View the cell at the intersection of this column and row to find your earnings of $12.00.

4. The messages you sent to and received from the other two participants before your decision in Task I will be observed by all 12 participants of today’s experiment (circle one): TRUE     FALSE
   Answer: FALSE. According to the instructions, only you and the other two persons in your cluster-group will see these messages.

5. You will be informed of the other two participants’ choices of X before you make your choice of X (circle one): TRUE     FALSE
   Answer: FALSE. According to the instructions, you do not know the other two participants’ choices of X when you make your selection.
Instructions for Task II

During Task II of the experiment you will interact with the other five participants in your cluster, and will make one decision in Task II. For example, if you are a Gamma-Square decision maker, you will interact with the other two Gamma-Square decision makers and the three Gamma-Circle decision makers.

Your Choice in Task II

You will select a number denoted by X. The values of X you may choose are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. The value you pick for X and the minimum value of X chosen by all six participants (including yourself) will determine your payoff in Task II of the experiment. Note that this is similar to the situation in Task I and has the same payoff table, except that it now involves six participants, and the minimum value of X is determined by the choices of all six participants. The decision screen in Figure 2 indicates how your earnings for this task are determined by your choice and the choices of others.

Before making their actual choice, the six participants have an opportunity to privately communicate with each other. Before this communication phase begins, you will input proposals for your choice of X. This is your initial proposal only, and you are free to choose whatever choice of X you prefer when you make the actual decision for X after the communication phase is over.

After all six participants click “Submit,” all six proposals will be shown on the six participants’ screens. At this point, you will be able to chat with the other five participants for 2 minutes in a chat window. This communication will again take place in English. Although we will record the messages that you send, only you and the other five participants in your cluster will see them. Note, in sending messages back and forth between you and the other persons we request that you again follow two simple rules: (1) Be civil to each other and use no profanity and (2) Do not identify yourself.

After the chat period is over, an “input box” will appear to allow you to enter your choice of X. When you are ready to make your choice, click “Submit”. Note that you do not know the other five participants’ choices of X when you make your selection.

After all decisions have been made, the computer will determine the minimum value of X chosen by the six participants, and will determine your earnings. All this information will be displayed on the outcome screen.
Figure 2: Decision Screen for Task II
Summing up, the following will occur in Task II:

1. You and the other five decision makers from your cluster will be asked to enter your choice of X.

2. Before you make your decision, you and the other five participants have an opportunity to make initial proposals and privately communicate with each other for 2 minutes in a chat window. After the chat period is over, you make your decision without knowing the other five participants’ choices of X.

3. After all participants make their decisions, the computer will display the minimum value of X chosen by the six participants, and will determine your earnings for Task II.

Before we begin Task II you will take a short quiz on your computer to verify your understanding of these instructions for Task II. Please feel free to refer to the instructions as you answer the quiz questions. The computer will record how many quiz questions you answer correctly, and you will be paid $2 for each correct answer.

Are there any questions?
Computerized Quiz for Task II

Please note: The following examples were chosen randomly and are not meant to be suggestive. You will be paid $2 for correct answer(s) to each question.

1. If you are randomly assigned as a Delta-Circle decision maker, then in Task II, you will interact with five other participants--the other two Delta-Circle decision makers and the other three Delta-Square decision makers (circle one): TRUE     FALSE

Answer: TRUE. The instructions state that in this task, “you will interact with the other five participants in your cluster.”

2. The messages you sent to and received from the other five participants before your decision in Task II will be observed by all the six participants (circle one): TRUE FALSE

Answer: TRUE. According to the instructions, only you and the other five participants in your cluster will see these messages.

3. You will be informed of the other five participants’ choices of X before you make your choice of X (circle one): TRUE     FALSE

Answer: FALSE. The instructions explain that you do not know the other five participants’ choices of X when you make your selection.
Instructions for Task III

During Task III of the experiment you will interact with the other five participants in your cluster, and will make one decision in Task III. You and the other two participants in your cluster-group, who you interacted with in Task I, will form a three-person team. The other three participants in your cluster who belong to the other group will form the other team. For example, if you are a Gamma-Square decision maker, you will form a team with the other two Gamma-Square decision makers, while the three Gamma-Circle decision makers will form another team.

Your Choice in Task III

In this task, you will select between two actions, denoted by M and J. A team’s choice will be determined by majority rule. That is, the action that gets two or three votes from a team’s members will be the team’s choice.

The decision screen shown in Figure 3 indicates how your earnings for this task are determined by your team’s choice and the choice of the other team. The table on the left shows the earnings of each member of a team. Note that in each cell, the number in the bottom-left line is the earning of each member of your team, while the number in the upper-right line is the earning of each member of the other team.

Before making their actual choices, participants will have the opportunity to participate in three phases of communication. In the first phase, the three participants from the same cluster-group who form a team have an opportunity to privately communicate with each other. Before this communication phase begins, you will input proposals for your choice of M or J. This is your initial proposal only, and you are free to choose whatever you prefer when you make the actual decision of M or J after all communication phases are over.

After all three participants click “Submit,” all three proposals will be shown on the three participants’ screens. At this point, you will be able to chat with the other two participants for 3 minutes in a chat window. For example, if you are a Gamma-Square decision maker, you and the other two Gamma-Square decision makers who form a team will have the opportunity to privately communicate with each other, while the three Gamma-Circle decision makers who form a team will also have the opportunity to privately communicate with each other. Although we will record the messages you send, only you and the two other persons in your team will see the messages communicated in this phase. All communication will again take place in English.
After this first phase of communication is completed, you will then have the opportunity to communicate with the other two participants in your team as well as the three participants in the other team for 3 minutes. This communication will again be conducted in English. Although we will record the messages that you send, only you and the other five participants in your cluster will see the messages communicated in this phase.

After this second phase of communication is completed, the three participants from the same cluster-group who form a team have a final opportunity to privately communicate with each other. Before this last communication phase begins, you will again input proposals for your choice of M or J. This is again just a proposal, and you are free to choose whatever you prefer when you make the actual decision of M or J after this final communication phase is over.

After all three participants click “Submit,” all three proposals will be shown on the three participants’ screens. At this point, you will be able to chat with the other two participants for 3 minutes in a chat window. Although we will record the messages you send, only you and the two other persons in your team will see the messages communicated in this phase. All communication will again be conducted in English.
## Task III

Subject ID: Gamma Circle 2  
Your Team: 3 Gamma Circles  
Other Team: 3 Gamma Squares

### Payment to Each Team Member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your Team's Choice</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Other Team: $132 Each</td>
<td>Other Team: $162 Each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Your Team: $132 Each</td>
<td>Your Team: $28 Each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Other Team: $28 Each</td>
<td>Other Team: $54 Each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Your Team: $162 Each</td>
<td>Your Team: $54 Each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENTER YOUR Vote (either M or J):

Time has expired please enter your decision.
- Gamma Circle 1's INITIAL PROPOSAL: M
- Gamma Circle 2's INITIAL PROPOSAL: M
- Gamma Circle 3's INITIAL PROPOSAL: J

Figure 3: Decision Screen for Task III
Note, in sending messages back and forth between you and the other persons we request that you again follow two simple rules: (1) Be civil to each other and use no profanity and (2) Do not identify yourself.

After the final chat period is over, an “input box” will appear to allow you to enter your vote for the choice of M or J. When you are ready to make your choice, click “Submit”. Note that you do not know the votes of your teammates, or the choice by members of the other team when you make your selection.

After all decisions have been made, you will learn the choices made by each member of each team, the action taken by each team according to the majority rule, and the earning of the members of each team. This information will be displayed on an outcome screen.

Summing up, the following will happen in Task III:

1. You and the other two participants in your cluster-group will form a three-person team, while the other three participants in the same cluster who belong to the other group will form another team.

2. You will be asked to choose between M and J. The computer will implement the action that gets two or three votes from a team’s members as the team’s choice. The earnings of each participant are determined by the choice of your team and the choice of the other team.

3. Before you make your decision, you participate in three phases of communication. First, you and the other two participants in your team have an opportunity to make initial proposals and privately communicate with each other for 3 minutes in a chat window. Second, you and the other two participants in your team as well as the three participants in the other team have an opportunity to privately communicate with each other for 3 minutes in a chat window. Third, you and the other two participants in your team have the final opportunity to again make proposals and privately communicate with each other for 3 minutes in a chat window. After this final chat period is over, you make your choice without knowing the choices of your teammates or the choices by members of the other team.

4. After all participants make their decisions, the computer will display the choice made by each member of each team, the action taken by each team according to the majority rule, and the earning of the members of each team.

Before we begin Task III you will take a short quiz on your computer to verify your understanding of these instructions for Task III. Please feel free to refer back to the instructions as you answer the quiz questions. The computer will record how many quiz questions you answer correctly, and you will be paid $2 for each correct answer.

Are there any questions?
Computerized Quiz for Task III

Please note: The following examples were chosen randomly and are not meant to be suggestive. You will be paid $2 for correct answer(s) to each question.

1. In Task III of the experiment, you will interact with the other five participants in your cluster. If you are a Gamma-Circle decision maker, you will form a team with the other two Gamma-Circle decision makers, while the three Gamma-Square decision makers will form another team (circle one): TRUE FALSE

Answer: TRUE. According to the instructions: “You and the other two participants in your cluster-group, who you interacted with in Task I, will form a three person team. The other three participants in your same cluster who belong to the other group will form the other team.”

2. Suppose you are Gamma-Circle-1, and Gamma-Circle-2 chooses J and Gamma-Circle-3 chooses M. Then your team’s choice will be the same as your choice (circle one): TRUE FALSE.

Answer: TRUE. According to the instructions, “a team’s choice will be determined by majority rule. That is, the action that gets two or three votes from a team’s members will be the team’s choice.” In this case, given the “split votes” of your teammates, if you choose M, M becomes the majority’s choice of your team and hence will be your team’s choice. Similarly, if you choose J, J becomes the majority’s choice of your team and hence will be your team’s choice.

3. Suppose you are Delta-Square-1, and both Delta-Square-2 and Delta-Square-3 choose M. Then your team’s choice will always be the same as your choice (circle one): TRUE FALSE.

Answer: FALSE. M gets two votes from your teammates and is the majority’s choice regardless of whether you choose M or J.

4. Suppose your team votes to choose J, and the other team votes to choose M. Then you and your teammates will each earn __ dollars, while each member of the other team will earn __ dollars.

Answer: T and S. Inspection of the table in Figure 2 shows that given that your team chooses J and the other team chooses M, each member of your team will earn T, and each member of the other team will earn S. This is displayed in the lower left of the table.

5. Suppose the other team votes to choose J. If your team chooses M each member of your team will earn __ dollars, and if your team chooses J each member of your team will earn __ dollars.

Answer: S and P. If the other team chooses J then the rightmost column of the table displays the earnings. If your team chooses M then the top right square is relevant, indicating earnings of S for
your team; if your team chooses J then the bottom right square is relevant, indicating earnings of P for your team.

6. Suppose the other team votes to choose M. If your team chooses M each member of your team will earn __ dollars, and if your team chooses J each member of your team will earn __ dollars.

Answer: R and T. If the other team chooses M then the leftmost column of the table displays the earnings. If your team chooses M then the top left square is relevant, indicating earnings of R for your team; if your team chooses J then the bottom left square is relevant, indicating earnings of T for your team.

7. You will be informed of the other team’s choice of M or J before you make your choice (circle one): TRUE     FALSE

Answer: FALSE. The instructions explain that “you do not know the votes of your teammates, or the choice by members of the other team when you make your selection.”

8. When communication is conducted between only you and the other two participants in your team, the messages you sent to and received from the other two participants will also be observed by the three participants from the other team (circle one): TRUE     FALSE

Answer: FALSE. According to the instructions, only you and the other two persons in your team will see these messages when communication is conducted only between you and the other two participants in your team.
Instructions for Task IV

Before we display the outcome from Task III you have an additional opportunity to earn money based on your guess about how the other team voted on the M and J choices.

To make this guess you will fill in the boxes on the prediction screen shown in Figure 4. These numbers indicate what you think the chances are that the other team will vote in the four possible indicated patterns. For example, suppose you think there is a 30% chance that this other team voted 3 M and 0 J, and a 70% chance that this team voted 2 M and 1 J. This indicates that you believe that 2 M and 1 J is more than twice as likely as 3 M and 0 J, and that you do not believe that either of the other two vote patterns will occur. [The probability percentages must sum to 100% or the computer won’t accept them.]

The computer will look at the votes actually made by the other team and compare their votes to your prediction. We will then pay you for your prediction as follows:

Suppose you predict that the other team will vote 2 M and 1 J with a 70% chance and vote 3 M and 0 J with a 30% chance (as in the example above). Suppose further that this team actually votes 2 M and 1 J. In that case your earnings from your prediction are

Prediction Payoff (2 M and 1 J vote) = 10 – 10(0.7^2 + 0.3^2 + 0^2 + 0^2) + 20(0.7) = 18.2 dollars.

In other words, we will give you a fixed amount of 10 dollars from which we will subtract and add different amounts. We subtract 10 times the sum of the squared probabilities you indicated for the four vote possibilities. Then we add 20 times the probability that you indicated for the vote of the other team actually made (0.7 probability in this example).

Continuing this example using these same predictions, if the other team actually votes 0 M and 3 J (which you predicted would happen with 0% probability), your prediction earnings are

Prediction Payoff (0 M and 3 J vote) = 10 – 10(0.7^2 + 0.3^2 + 0^2 + 0^2) + 20(0) = 4.2 dollars.

Your prediction payoff is higher (18.2) in the first part of this example than in the second part of this example (4.2) because your prediction was more accurate in the first part.

Note that the lowest payoff occurs under this payoff procedure when you state that you believe that there is a 100% chance that a particular vote will occur when it turns out that another vote is made. In this case your prediction payoff would be 0, so you can never lose earnings from inaccurate predictions. The highest payoff occurs when you predict correctly and assign 100% to the vote that turns out to be the actual vote made by the other team; in this case your prediction payoff would be 20 dollars.

Note that since your prediction is made before you know the vote of the other team, you maximize the expected size of your prediction payoff by simply stating your true beliefs about what you think this other team will do. Any other prediction will decrease the amount you can expect to earn from your prediction payoff.
Task IV
Subject ID: Gamma Circle 3
Your Team: 3 Gamma Circles
Other Teams: 3 Gamma Squares

Please indicate your best guess of the likelihood (out of 100%) that the other teams voted in the following patterns. The numbers you enter must sum to 100.

Other Team Voted 3 M and 0 J: 80.0%
Other Team Voted 2 M and 1 J: 0.0%
Other Team Voted 1 M and 2 J: 0.0%
Other Team Voted 0 M and 3 J: 0.0%

Sum of Likelihood = 80.0%

Remember that you maximize the expected amount that you earn for this guess by simply stating your true beliefs about what you think the other teams did.

Submit
Task V

Subject ID: Gamma Circle 2

In this task, you receive $5 and are asked to choose the portion of this amount that you would like to invest in a risky option between $0 and $5. The rest of the money is added to your Payoff from this task.

The risky investment has an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the investment fails, you lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive 3 times the amount invested.

How do we determine if you succeed or fail? First, you choose how much you wish to invest, you will then roll a "virtual coin" to determine whether you succeed or fail. If the "virtual coin" comes up heads, you earn 3 times the amount you chose to invest. If the "virtual coin" comes up tails, you lose the amount you chose to invest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount Invested</th>
<th>Payoff if TAILS</th>
<th>Payoff if HEADS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$15.00 = $5.00 \times 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td>$14.00 = $4.00 \times 3</td>
</tr>
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<td>$3.00</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
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<td>$9.00 = $1.00 \times 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>$0.50</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
<td>$8.00 = $0.50 \times 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please enter how much you would like to invest in a risky option: [ ]

You will "flip" a virtual coin to determine your payoff.

Submit Investment
Post-experiment survey

Please answer ALL of the questions in this brief survey as accurately as you can. All answers are confidential, and in fact your answers are linked only to your participant ID for today's experiment, and not your name or student ID.

1. What is your age in years?

2. What is your gender?
   Male
   Female

3. What is your main field of study at the University?
   Economics and/or Finance (BEcon, BEcon&Fin, BFin, BSc in Quantitative Finance)
   Architecture
   Arts
   Business (excluding BEcon, BEcon&Fin, BFin)
   Dentistry
   Education
   Engineering
   Law
   Medicine
   Science (excluding BSc in Quantitative Finance)
   Social Sciences
   Other

4. Where were you born?
   Hong Kong
   Mainland China
   Macau
   Taiwan
   North America
   Central/South America
   Australia/New Zealand
   Other Pacific Nation
   South-East Asia
   South Asia
   Other Asia
   Western Europe
   Northern Europe
   Eastern Europe
   Africa

5. If you were not born in Hong Kong, how long have you lived in Hong Kong?
   More than 5 years
   2 - 5 years
6. How many siblings (brothers or sisters) do you have?

None, I do not have any siblings
1 sibling
2 siblings
3 siblings
4 or more siblings

7. What is your order of birth among your siblings?

I do not have any siblings
I have siblings and I am the oldest
I have siblings and I am the youngest
I have both older and younger siblings

8. What is your cumulative GPA at the University?

Between 3.5-4
Between 3-3.49
Between 2.5-2.99
Between 2-2.49
Below 2
Not applicable since this is my first semester at the University

9. Are you an undergraduate student (which year?) or a graduate student?

1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year or above
Graduate Student

10. How many economics experiments have you participated in before this one?

None
1 - 2 previous
3 - 5 previous
More than 5 previous

NEW SCREEN STARTS HERE
The following two questions concern Task I, where your earnings depended on your choice of X and the minimum choice of X made by the other two participants in your group.

11. Please indicate whether communication with the other two participants in Task I changed your final choice of X compared to what you intended to choose before communication (a YES answer means that communication changed your choice).
12. On a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate how dissatisfied/satisfied you are with the outcome in Task I?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Moderately dissatisfied
3. Neutral. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied
4. Moderately satisfied
5. Very satisfied

NEW SCREEN STARTS HERE
The next two questions concern Task II, where your earnings depended on your choice of X and the minimum choice of X made by the other five participants.

13. Please indicate whether communication with the other five participants in Task II changed your final choice of X compared to what you intended to choose before communication (a YES answer means that communication changed your choice).

Yes__________
Please explain what are the most important reasons that communication changed your decision in this task

No__________
Please explain what are the most important reasons that communication did not change your decision in this task

14. On a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate how dissatisfied/satisfied you are with the outcome in Task II?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Moderately dissatisfied
3. Neutral. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied
4. Moderately satisfied
5. Very satisfied

NEW SCREEN STARTS HERE
The next set of questions concern Task III, where your earnings depended on your team’s votes for M and J, as well as the other team’s votes for M and J.
15. Please indicate whether communication in Task III changed your final choice between M and J compared to what you intended to choose before communication (a YES answer means that communication changed your choice).

Yes_____________
Please explain what are the most important reasons that communication changed your decision in this task ________________
No_____________
Please explain what are the most important reasons that communication did not change your decision in this task ________________

16. On a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate the relative importance of the concern for your team’s earning and the concern for the other team’s earning in affecting your choice between M and J in Task III

1. The concern for my team’s earning is significantly more important than the concern for the other team’s earning in affecting my decision
2. The concern for my team’s earning is moderately more important than the concern for the other team’s earning in affecting my decision
3. Neutral. The concern for my team’s earning is equally important as the concern for the other team’s earning in affecting my decision
4. The concern for my team’s earning is moderately less important than the concern for the other team’s earning in affecting my decision
5. The concern for my team’s earning is significantly less important than the concern for the other team’s earning in affecting my decision

17. On a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate how dissatisfied/satisfied you are with the choice of your two teammates in Task III?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Moderately dissatisfied
3. Neutral. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied
4. Moderately satisfied
5. Very satisfied

18. On a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate how dissatisfied/satisfied you are with the choice of the other team in Task III?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Moderately dissatisfied
3. Neutral. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied
4. Moderately satisfied
5. Very satisfied

19. On a scale from 1 to 5, please rate how closely attached you felt to your two other teammates throughout the experiment, and especially during Task III.
   1. Not closely attached at all.
   2. A little attached.
   3. Moderately attached.
   4. Strongly attached.
   5. Very strongly attached.

20. In Task III, when you voted, how would you describe the strategies you used? Please select all that apply.
   1. I tried to earn as much money as possible for myself.
   2. I tried to earn as much money as possible for me and my two teammates.
   3. I tried to earn as much money as possible for all six people in my cluster group.
   4. I tried to earn more money for my team than what individuals earned on the other team.
   5. Other (please type in here) _______________________

NEW SCREEN STARTS HERE
The final questions concern your views in general, and not specifically for the tasks in today’s experiment.

21. Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
   1. Always trusted
   2. Usually trusted
   3. Usually not trusted
   4. Always not trusted

22. How trusting are you?
   1. Always trusting
   2. Usually trusting
   3. Usually not trusting
   4. Always not trusting

Thank you for your participation! Please wait until the experimenter pays you. Have a nice day.