

## 1. Introduction

This paper studies theoretically and experimentally the hypothesis that prior interactions may influence individuals' concerns for the welfare of members of their out-group and affect cooperation in a one-shot inter-group prisoner's dilemma (hereafter IPD). Many interactions between groups resemble an IPD, and social contexts and prior interactions can significantly affect inter-group cooperation. For example, the economics department and the business school of a university may need to decide whether to cooperate on a joint infrastructure project, such as an economics laboratory; or members of the marketing department and the engineering department of a firm may need to work together to develop a new product. Whenever the material incentives are such that 'Defect' is the dominant strategy for both groups, but 'Both Cooperate' Pareto dominates 'Both Defect,' the interaction between the two groups is an IPD. While interactions between groups resembling the IPD occur frequently, such interactions take place in vastly different social contexts. At some universities, the economics department and the business school rarely interact, while at others the two groups may regularly host joint seminars. In some firms, members from different departments interact only in formal business meetings, while in others the different departments may share common spaces and conduct company-sponsored community work.

To investigate how contexts and prior interactions matter in affecting inter-group cooperation, this study develops theoretically a possible microfoundation and experimentally tests whether it has empirical support. Specifically, inspired by the literature in psychology and economics on how identity and in-group out-group differences affect cooperation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Chen and Li, 2009), we propose and experimentally test the *prior interaction hypothesis* for the IPD. This hypothesis states that successful prior inter-group interactions that produce rewards for members from different groups but have no impact on the material payoff of a subsequent IPD played by these groups can still increase cooperation in the IPD. This is because such successful prior interactions increase individuals' concerns for the welfare of their out-group and make cooperating with the out-group a more desirable action psychologically.

Building on Chen and Li (2009), we develop a group-contingent social preferences model for a (symmetric) IPD played by two  $n$ -player groups, in which every player is inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), but every player is more envious of or less charitable towards members of their out-group. Each group's decision is determined by majority rule. Although the examples mentioned above often involve repeated interaction, in the model and the experiment we consider non-repeated interactions in order to sharpen the focus on the effects of prior interaction on individuals' concerns for the out-group and avoid reputational concerns. Not surprisingly, if social preferences are sufficiently strong, this IPD with group-contingent social preferences and pivotal voting has three equilibria: Everyone Cooperates, Everyone Defects, and a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The two pure-strategy equilibria that feature either

full Cooperation or Defection are rarely observed in existing studies of IPDs (see, for example, Insko et al., 1990; Schopler et al., 2001; Halevy et al., 2008; Gong et al. 2009 and the references cited there). The mixed-strategy equilibrium, however, generates the counter-intuitive and implausible prediction that cooperation will decrease if individuals become more charitable or less envious of their out-group. Thus group-contingent social preferences and Nash equilibrium can explain cooperation in the IPD, but predict that if successful prior interactions increase individuals' pro-social concerns for their out-group they will actually decrease cooperation.

We then consider decision errors and study the Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) of the IPD. We do this for the following reasons. Our objective is to investigate how prior interaction affects cooperation in the IPD. We therefore abstract from repeated interaction, and learning from past play of the IPD (with possibly different groups), by only allowing subjects play the IPD once in the experiment. Playing the IPD with majority and pivotal voting requires individuals to make non-trivial strategic calculations. When individuals are playing the IPD once and for the first time, they may make mistakes or have uncertain social preferences. Previous work has shown that the QRE introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) can account for decision errors and stochastic preferences and can be consistent with observed behavior that is incompatible with counter-intuitive predictions of Nash equilibrium in many experimental games (see, for example, Goeree and Holt, 2001; Cason and Mui, 2005; Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Battaglini et al., 2010 and the references cited there).<sup>1</sup> In addition, the use of QRE enables us to utilize previous work on the QRE and equilibrium selection (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Turocy, 2005) to provide conditions under which an increase in pro-social concerns for the other group increases cooperation in this model of the IPD that has multiple equilibria.

We also report a laboratory experiment to study empirically whether successful prior interaction increases individuals' concerns for their out-group and promotes cooperation in the IPD. The experiment implements a one-shot minimum effort coordination game as the prior interaction. This is because many social interactions employed by organizations to promote subsequent inter-group cooperation have negligible elements of conflict and can be approximated by a coordination game. Subjects are randomly assigned to different three-person groups, and in all treatments subjects in a group first play a minimum effort coordination game to build group identity. We find that in a Baseline treatment in which two three-person groups play a one-shot IPD, only 8.3% of subjects cooperate. In the Inter-group Coordination treatment, the six members from two groups play a one-shot, six-person minimum effort coordination game prior to playing the one-shot IPD. Subjects achieve the efficient outcome in all six-person coordination games, and this successful prior interaction increases subjects' cooperation rate in the IPD to

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<sup>1</sup> The probabilistic choice of the QRE can be interpreted as reflecting decision errors or stochastic preferences (or preference "shocks"). These different interpretations result in the same mathematical model. For brevity, in the text we will typically refer to decision errors.

41.7%. A post-experiment survey and chat coding results of communication by subjects that use a natural language classification game (Houser and Xiao, 2011) both show that compared to the Baseline treatment, subjects in the Inter-group Coordination treatment show a stronger concern for the welfare of their out-group.

## 2. Related Literature

Our work builds on and contributes to the economic literature on identity. As emphasized by psychologists, social identity can have an important influence on human behavior (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, Turner, 1999), and people often treat members of their own group differently than members of other groups (Brewer, 1979).<sup>2</sup> Recently, pioneered by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), economists have begun to study the influence of identity on economic behavior. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010) argue that a person's sense of self is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave, and individuals lose utility insofar as they, or others, fail to live up to these beliefs regarding what people should or should not do.

Building on Akerlof and Kranton (2000), recent studies in economics have shown that identity induced in the laboratory can affect behavior. Researchers have found that common group identity increases contributions in public goods games (Eckel and Grossman 2005), facilitates coordination in the battle of sexes game (Charness et al., 2007) and the minimum effort game (Chen and Chen, 2011), and increases relation-specific investment (Morita and Servátka, 2013). Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) find that playing against trustors from the out-group reduces the return rates of trustees in a trust game. Chen and Li (2009) study how identity affects social preferences, and find that subjects are more envious of and less charitable to out-group members.

While the importance of group boundaries is emphasized in the emerging economics literature on identity, somewhat surprisingly both the theoretical and experimental work discussed above focuses on how identity and group boundaries affect the strategic interactions in which all decision-makers are *individuals* (who may belong to different groups). Our paper, instead, considers how identity and group boundaries affect the strategic interactions in which each decision-maker is a *group*. We hypothesize that successful prior interactions that have no impact on the material payoff of a subsequent IPD can increase cooperation in the IPD, because they increase individuals' concerns for their out-group and make cooperating with the out-group a more desirable action psychologically. We report evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Our paper is also related to contributions that emphasize how social preferences can transform a prisoner's dilemma into a stag hunt game that has multiple equilibria in which Both Cooperate Pareto

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<sup>2</sup> See Chen and Li (2009) for a review of the psychology literature on identity.

dominates Both Defect (see, for example, the early work of Sen (1967); and Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Knez and Camerer, 2000; Ahn et al., 2001; Basu, 2010). More precisely, as Ellingsen et al. (2012) has pointed out, in the presence of social preferences it is possible that while the *game form* (which summarizes the objective features of strategies and payoffs) faced by the players is a prisoner's dilemma, the *game* (which involves von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities) being played is actually a stag hunt game.

In his recent study regarding how endogenous evolution of moral values affects cooperation, Tabellini (2008) also considers a one-shot individual PD in which agents care both about material payoff and the psychological utility from taking the morally correct action of cooperating. Once again, the psychological utility transforms the PD into a stag hunt game. Values evolve endogenously in Tabellini's model because parents make decisions that shape their child's concerns for moral satisfaction.

All the work discussed above on the PD as a stag hunt game in utilities focuses on the individual PD. In contrast, we are interested in the inter-group PD. We report novel evidence that prior interaction increases individual's concerns for their out-group and promotes inter-group cooperation in the IPD. This evidence strengthens the case for studying how endogenous changes in social preferences can affect cooperation in PD-like situations.

Our work also relates to Sobel's (2005) observation about social preferences and repeated interactions. Sobel (2005, p. 420) argues that besides the familiar folk theorem and reputational arguments that emphasize, respectively, foregone future benefits in deterring cheating and players' uncertainty about their opponent's motive, there is a need to study a third mechanism regarding how repetition affects cooperation: "A history of positive interaction with someone leads you to care about that person's welfare." Sobel makes this point in the context of repeated play of the same stage game, while our study focuses on how prior success in a one-shot coordination game affects cooperation and concerns for the out-group in the one-shot IPD.

This study also contributes to an emerging experimental economics literature that studies "sequential spill-over effects" in games, which investigates how the play of a first game may affect behavior in an unrelated second game. Knez and Camerer (2000) show that achieving the efficient outcome in a repeated seven-action minimum effort coordination game increases cooperation in a later three-action (multiple step) repeated PD compared to a control treatment. Ahn et al. (2001) report a similar result when the repeated coordination game is a two-action stag hunt game and the subsequent repeated game is the standard PD.<sup>3</sup> Similar sequential positive spill-over effects have also been found

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<sup>3</sup> Ahn et al. (2001) also report a similar but quantitatively smaller result when each player first plays a series of stag hunt games with a different player each period under random matching, and then plays a series of PD with a different player each period under random matching.

involving other games (see, for example, Devetag, 2005; Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Cason et al., 2012).<sup>4</sup>

All these studies consider games in which every decision maker is an individual, and subjects play both the first game (the “prior interaction” in our terminology) and the second game (the “target interaction” in our terminology) multiple times, either in a fixed partner matching in which a subject interacts with the same subject, or in a random matching environment in which a subject interacts with a randomly chosen subject each time. None of these studies focus on whether the prior interaction increases individuals’ concerns for members of their out-group. Our finding is novel as it shows that success in achieving the efficient outcome in a one-shot inter-group coordination game can increase individuals’ concerns for the out-group and can increase cooperation in a subsequent one-shot IPD.

Finally, this study adds to a surprisingly small economic literature on the IPD. A sizable literature in psychology has shown that groups cooperate less than individuals in the IPD (see, for example, Insko et al., 1990; Schopler et al., 2001; Gong et al. 2009 and the references cited there). This finding is crucial in leading to what psychologists refer to as the *discontinuity effect*, which states that “in mixed motive situations, inter-group interactions are more competitive or less cooperative than interindividual interactions” (Schopler et al., 2001, p. 632) .

While many studies in economics investigate behavior in the individual PD, very few study the IPD. Charness and Sutter (2012) and Kugler et al. (2012) recently survey the fast-growing experimental literature on individual versus group decision making in economics. Virtually none of this work (covered either in Charness and Sutter (2012) or their on-line Appendix on Suggested Further Reading, or in Kugler et al. (2012)) studies the IPD.<sup>5</sup> Most studies in the small IPD literature focus on the repeated IPD (Bornstein et al., 1994; Insko et al., 1998; Goren and Bornstein, 2000; and Kroll et al., 2013). Halevy et al. (2008) extends the IPD to allow players to choose between contributing to helping in-group members and hurting out-group members. Our study is the first that links the recent literature of identity economics and the importance of prior interaction to the under-studied IPD.

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<sup>4</sup> Researchers have also studied spill-over effects when subjects play two games simultaneously, see, for example, Bednar et al. (2012); Cason et al., (2012); and Falk et al. (2013), and the references cited there.

<sup>5</sup> Charness et al. (2007) is one of the studies discussed by Charness and Sutter (2012) that investigates the PD. In that study, a subject plays the individual PD with another subject, but in one treatment a subject also gets one-third of the sum of the payoffs received by members of his/her (randomly induced) in-group. Almost all the work regarding the IPD discussed by Kugler et al. (2012) are from the psychology literature on the discontinuity effect. Exceptions include Morgan and Tindale (2002) (who consider PDs in the individual vs. individual condition, the group vs. group condition, and the individual vs. group condition) and Charness et al. (2007). Exploiting the fact that the Swiss military randomly assigns candidates for training program to different platoons, Goette et al. (2012) compares the behavior of individuals in such randomly assigned social groups to those of individuals in randomly assigned minimum groups. They find that the former cooperate more in the PD, but they consider the PD played by individuals. Chakravarty et al. (2016) study how Hindu and Muslim subjects in rural India play the individual stag hunt game and the individual PD differently with in-group and out-group members. In their experiment, subjects play the PD followed by the stag hunt game and the spill-over effect from one game to the other is not their focus.

### 3. The Model

#### 3.1 The Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma with group-contingent social preferences

Consider an IPD played by two groups. Each group consists of an odd number of  $n = 2m + 1$  players, with  $m \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$ .<sup>6</sup> A group's decision is determined by majority voting, and members of each group cast their votes between Cooperate (C) and Defect (D) simultaneously. In making her decision, an individual needs to take into account how members from both her in-group and out-group will vote. Every member of a group always gets the same material payoff. In Table 1, the material payoff of each member of the two groups is given as a function of the decisions made by each group, through the majority voting rule. This game can be analyzed as a  $2n$  players voting game.

We make the standard assumptions:

$$T > R > P > S \quad (1)$$

$$2R > T + S \quad (2)$$

Equation (1) guarantees that if players are only concerned about their material payoff, then a pivotal player will always vote for D and  $(C, C)$  Pareto dominates  $(D, D)$ . Equation (2) implies that  $(C, C)$  is the total-surplus maximizing outcome.

		Group 2	
		Cooperate	Defect
Group 1	Cooperate	$R, R$	$S, T$
	Defect	$T, S$	$P, P$

**Table 1: The Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma Game Form**

If individuals are only concerned about their material interests, then achieving cooperation in the one-shot IPD can be difficult. As discussed above, however, social preferences can transform a prisoner's dilemma into a Stag hunt game that has multiple equilibria in which Both Cooperate Pareto dominates Both Defect. Because there will be multiple equilibria, in order to study the comparative static question of how an increase in individuals' concerns for their out-group members' welfare affects the equilibrium rate of cooperation, we shall need to address the problem of equilibrium selection in our analysis.

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<sup>6</sup> When  $n$  is even, we need to consider the implications of different tie-breaking rules (such as the flip of a coin, or a cooperate (or defect) default rule when tie occurs). For brevity, we do not consider even-sized groups here. Our results also apply for the model with  $m=0$ . In this degenerate case, the IPD model becomes the individual PD. However, we do not examine the individual PD in this paper.

Note that many different forms of social preferences can transform the IPD into a game that is akin to a stag-hunt game. The objective of our study is not to investigate which specific form of social preferences best explains behavior in the IPD. Our goal, instead, is to study how success in prior interactions may affect individuals' rate of cooperation in a subsequent IPD. Thus, the purpose of this modeling exercise is to see how, with appropriate equilibrium selection arguments, we can use a model of the IPD with social preferences and majority voting to study the comparative static question of how an increase in individuals' concerns for their out-group members' welfare affect cooperation rates and beliefs in equilibrium.

For our purpose, we adopt the model of group-contingent social preferences that Chen and Li (2009) develop in their pioneering experimental work on identity and social preferences, as that model provides a natural way to capture the idea that individuals may have a stronger concern for the welfare of their in-group members than out-group members. In their model, individuals have identical, inequity-averse preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and they report experimental evidence that subjects are more envious and less charitable to members of their out-group. In the following analysis, we assume that the  $2n$  agents in the IPD have identical group-contingent preferences and are inequity averse. Individuals' preferences are given by the utility function:

$$v_j(\pi_j, \pi_k, n) = \pi_j - nw^o(n)(\pi_j - \pi_k); j, k = 1, 2; j \neq k, \quad (3)$$

where  $v_j(\dots)$  is the utility of a player in group  $j$ ,  $\pi_j$  is the material payoff received by a player in group  $j$ ,  $\pi_k$  is the material payoff received by each player in group  $k$ , and  $w^o(n)$  is the weight that a player in group  $j$  puts on the material payoff of each of the  $n$  players in her out-group. The reasons that  $v_j$  depends on  $\pi_j$  and  $\pi_k$  according to (3) are as follows.

Since members of a group in the IPD always receive the same material payoff, the effect of social preferences only arise from the possible difference in a player's payoff and those of members of her out-group. We represent these features through the term  $w^o(n)$  in (3), as

$$w^o(n) = \frac{1}{2n-1}(\rho r + \sigma s), \quad (4)$$

where

$$\rho > 0 > \sigma, \quad (5)$$

and  $r = 1$  if  $\pi_j > \pi_k$ , and  $r = 0$  otherwise. Similarly,  $s = 1$  if  $\pi_j < \pi_k$ , and  $s = 0$  otherwise. If an agent has a higher material payoff than an agent in her out-group, then the extent that she is *charitable* to an agent in her out-group is given by the charity parameter  $\rho$ . If an agent has a lower material payoff

than an agent in her out-group, then the extent that she is *envious* of an agent in her out-group is given by the envy parameter  $\sigma$ .

Applying the social preferences specification (3) through (5) to the IPD in Table 1 results in the IPD with group-contingent social preferences (hereafter often simply referred to as the IPD) given in Table 2.

		Group 2	
		Cooperate	Defect
Group 1	Cooperate	$R, R$	$S + \frac{n}{2n-1}\sigma(T-S), T - \frac{n}{2n-1}\rho(T-S)$
	Defect	$T - \frac{n}{2n-1}\rho(T-S), S + \frac{n}{2n-1}\sigma(T-S)$	$P, P$

**Table 2: The IPD with Group-Contingent Social Preferences**

### 3.2 Nash equilibrium

We first focus on the (symmetric) Nash equilibria of the IPD. It turns out that the properties of the Nash equilibria, as well as the logit equilibria of the IPD (to be introduced in Section 3.3), depend on which one of the following four mutually-exhaustive cases is satisfied:

$$R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1}\rho(T-S) \right] \leq 0, \quad (6)$$

$$0 < R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1}\rho(T-S) \right] < P - \left[ S + \frac{n}{2n-1}\sigma(T-S) \right], \quad (7)$$

$$0 < P - \left[ S + \frac{n}{2n-1}\sigma(T-S) \right] = R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1}\rho(T-S) \right], \quad (8)$$

or

$$0 < P - \left[ S + \frac{n}{2n-1}\sigma(T-S) \right] < R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1}\rho(T-S) \right]. \quad (9)$$



To interpret these conditions, consider the IPD with given material payoff parameters  $(P, R, S, T)$ . When (6) is satisfied, the extent of social preferences is not strong enough—that is, the values of  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  are sufficiently low—that the prediction is similar to the pure self-interest model, which is a special case (with  $\sigma = \rho = 0$ ) of this IPD when (6) holds. In this case, a pivotal player will always choose D, and  $(D, D)$  is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.<sup>7</sup>

When agents' concerns for the out-group increases—that is, when  $\rho$  and/or  $\sigma$  increase—we move from (6) to (7), (8), or (9), with condition (9) capturing environments in which agents have the strongest concerns for the out-group. When (7), (8) or (9) is satisfied, if an agent is the pivotal decision maker of her group and the other group cooperates, then she strictly prefers to cooperate. While D will give her a higher material payoff, it will also lead her to suffer from a psychological disutility because her material payoff is higher than that of the members of the other group. When (7), (8) or (9) holds, this disutility is significant enough (when  $R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1} \rho(T-S) \right] > 0$ ) to make D unattractive, and the IPD becomes a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Focusing on symmetric equilibria, this game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: Everyone Cooperates and Everyone Defects, and a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

To derive the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, let  $x \in \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$  denote the number of players who vote for C in a player's out-group. A player who is pivotal in her group will be willing to randomize iff the utility difference between choosing C and D is zero. Thus, the equilibrium probability of choosing C,  $q^*$ , is given by

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[ \sum_{x=0}^m \binom{n}{x} (q^*)^x (1-q^*)^{n-x} \right] \left\{ P - \left[ S + \frac{n}{2n-1} \sigma(T-S) \right] \right\} \\ & = \left[ \sum_{x=m+1}^n \binom{n}{x} (q^*)^x (1-q^*)^{n-x} \right] \left\{ R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1} \rho(T-S) \right] \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

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<sup>7</sup> More precisely, we are actually focusing on trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium in our analysis. As common in voting games, there also exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium Everyone Cooperates that involves the use of weakly-dominated strategy. In this equilibrium, because every player is non-pivotal, every player is indifferent between choosing the weakly dominated strategy C and D. Hence, Everyone Cooperates can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium, however, is not robust, as any positive probability of any member in his group choosing D will make a player strictly prefer D to C.

where  $\sum_{x=0}^m \binom{n}{x} (q^*)^x (1-q^*)^{n-x}$  is the probability that an agent's out-group will defect (with  $m$  or less members of the group voting C), while  $\sum_{x=m+1}^n \binom{n}{x} (q^*)^x (1-q^*)^{n-x}$  is the probability that her out-group will cooperate. We summarize useful properties of the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the IPD in Proposition 1 (All proofs of the results in the main text are given in Appendix A).

**Proposition 1.**

At the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the IPD,

- (a) the probability that a player chooses C,  $q^*$  given in (10), is unique in the interval  $(0,1)$  when condition (7), (8) or (9) holds;
- (b)  $q^* > 0.5$  when (7) holds,  $q^* = 0.5$  when (8) holds, and  $q^* < 0.5$  when (9) holds;
- (c)  $\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \rho} < 0$ ;
- (d)  $\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \sigma} < 0$ .

Some aspects of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the relationship of  $q^*$  versus the charitable parameter  $\rho$  in an IPD with  $n = 3$ . We fix the material payoff parameters as those in our experiment:  $(P, R, S, T) = (54, 132, 28, 162)$ , and informed by the empirical findings in Chen and Li (2009), for this illustration, we fix the value of  $\sigma$  at  $-0.112$ . It is observed that  $q^*$  is a decreasing function of  $\rho$  when (7), (8) or (9) is satisfied. This illustrates a well-known observation that because each player's probability of randomization is chosen to make other players willing to randomize in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the mixed-strategy equilibrium often generates counter-intuitive predictions. In the IPD, an increase in agents' charitable concerns for others makes choosing C more attractive. If all players of the other group continue to choose C with probability  $q^*$ , then the player will prefer C and will not randomize between C and D. To ensure that the player will still be indifferent between C and D and will randomize after an increase in  $\rho$ , players of the other group must now play C with a *lower* probability at the new mixed-strategy equilibrium.

Summing up, the two pure-strategy equilibria predict either complete Cooperation or complete Defection, which are rarely observed in existing studies of IPDs (Insko et al., 1990, Schopler et al., 2001;

Halevy et al., 2008; Gong et al. 2009). The mixed-strategy equilibrium, however, generates the counter-intuitive and implausible prediction that an increase in pro-social concerns for the out-group will decrease cooperation. While a model incorporating group-contingent social preferences alone can explain why cooperation can occur in the IPD, it generates the counter-intuitive and implausible prediction that greater concerns for the other group will decrease cooperation.




Figure 1: Symmetric Mixed strategy equilibrium

### 3.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium

Motivated by the observation that decision makers may make mistakes or experience preference shocks, especially in an unfamiliar strategic environment, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) developed the concept of QRE. Subsequent work shows that the QRE can account for observed behavior that is incompatible with counter-intuitive predictions of Nash equilibrium in many experimental games (Goeree and Holt, 2001; Cason and Mui, 2005; Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Battaglini et al., 2010). Both decision errors and preference shocks can be important in the one-shot IPD in our experiment. We therefore consider the QRE of the IPD with group-contingent social preferences, and focus on the logistic quantal

response function and the corresponding logit equilibrium.<sup>8</sup> Importantly, considering this equilibrium allows us to draw on McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Turocy (2005) regarding QRE and equilibrium selection, and perform comparative static analysis regarding the effects of an increase in individuals' concerns for out-group members' welfare.

Let  $\alpha_{ij}$  be the probability that agent  $i$  in group  $j$  will cooperate. Let  $(\alpha_{1j}, \dots, \alpha_{ij}, \dots, \alpha_{nj}, \alpha_{1k}, \dots, \alpha_{nk}) = (\alpha_{ij}, \alpha_{-ij})$  be the strategy profile adopted by the  $2n$  agents, where  $\alpha_{-ij}$  denote the strategy chosen by agents other than agent  $ij$ . The logistic quantal response function of player  $ij$ ,  $g_{ij}(\alpha_{-ij})$ , specifies player  $ij$ 's probability of playing C as a function of  $\alpha_{-ij}$  and is defined as:

$$g_{ij}(\alpha_{-ij}) = \frac{e^{\lambda u_{ij}(1, \alpha_{-ij})}}{e^{\lambda u_{ij}(1, \alpha_{-ij})} + e^{\lambda u_{ij}(0, \alpha_{-ij})}}, \forall i = 1, \dots, n, \forall j = 1, 2 \quad (11)$$

where  $u_{ij}(1, \alpha_{-ij})$  is agent  $ij$ 's expected utility when she cooperates and others play  $\alpha_{-ij}$ , and  $u_{ij}(0, \alpha_{-ij})$  is her expected utility when she defects and others play  $\alpha_{-ij}$ . The logit precision parameter  $\lambda$  captures how sensitive an agent's decision is to the utility difference between playing C and D:  $\lambda = 0$  implies that actions consist of all errors and the quantal response involves randomization with probability 0.5 between C and D, while  $\lambda = \infty$  means that there is no error and she will choose the best response to others' strategies. Other than these extreme cases, the R.H.S. of (11) implies that a player will *better respond*: she will choose both C and D with a positive probability, and the action that gives her a higher expected utility will be played with a higher probability. The logit equilibrium is a strategy profile  $(\alpha_{ij}^*, \alpha_{-ij}^*)$  satisfying the fixed point conditions:

$$\alpha_{ij}^* = g_{ij}(\alpha_{-ij}^*), \forall i = 1, \dots, n, \forall j = 1, 2 \quad (12)$$

Focusing on the symmetric logit equilibrium such that every agent cooperates with the same probability ( $\alpha_{ij} = \alpha, \forall i = 1, \dots, n, \forall j = 1, 2$ ), the logit equilibrium is determined by:

$$\alpha^* = g(\alpha^*, \lambda; \rho, \sigma; P, R, S, T), \quad (13)$$

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<sup>8</sup> McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) first consider the case that the players use a general quantal response function capturing decision errors, and define the QRE as the equilibrium when all players' quantal responses are mutually consistent. They then obtain further results when the players use a particular quantal response function, the logistic quantal response function (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Section 3). The corresponding equilibrium when players use logistic quantal response function is called the logit equilibrium. The logit equilibrium has been widely used in the applications of the QRE, and is a special case of the regular QRE that ensures that the QRE has empirically falsifiable implications (see, Goeree et al., 2008, Haile et al., 2008, and Goeree et al., 2016). For example, Chen and Chen (2011) adapt Chen and Li's (2009) group-contingent social preferences model to the minimum effort coordination game and study the logit equilibrium of the modified coordination game.

where  $g(\alpha, \lambda, \rho, \sigma, P, R, S, T)$  is the symmetric logistic quantal response function. For simplicity, we shall sometimes suppress the fact that the logistic quantal response function also depends on the social preferences parameters and the material payoff parameters,<sup>9</sup> and simply write the logistic quantal response function of the IPD,  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$ , as follows:

$$g(\alpha, \lambda) = \frac{e^{\lambda u_{ij}(1, \alpha, \dots, \alpha)}}{e^{\lambda u_{ij}(1, \alpha, \dots, \alpha)} + e^{\lambda u_{ij}(0, \alpha, \dots, \alpha)}} \quad (14)$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + e^{\lambda \left[ \binom{2m}{m} \alpha^m (1-\alpha)^m \right] \left[ \sum_{x=0}^m \binom{n}{x} \alpha^x (1-\alpha)^{n-x} \right] \left[ P - \left[ S + \frac{n}{2n-1} \sigma(T-S) \right] \right] + \left[ \sum_{x=m+1}^n \binom{n}{x} \alpha^x (1-\alpha)^{n-x} \right] \left[ \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1} \rho(T-S) \right] - R \right]}}$$

where  $(1, \alpha, \dots, \alpha)$  and  $(0, \alpha, \dots, \alpha)$  means player  $ij$  cooperates and defects respectively, when all other players cooperate with probability  $\alpha$ .

To interpret (14), note that C and D will generate a different expected utility if and only if agent  $ij$  is the pivotal decision-maker in her group, that is, if and only  $m$  members choose C while the other  $m$  members choose D in her group. The probability that player  $ij$  is pivotal is  $\binom{2m}{m} \alpha^m (1-\alpha)^m$ . If the other group defects (which occurs with probability  $\left[ \sum_{x=0}^m \binom{n}{x} \alpha^x (1-\alpha)^{n-x} \right]$ ), the utility difference of player  $ij$  between C and D is  $P - \left[ S + \frac{n}{2n-1} \sigma(T-S) \right]$ . If the other group cooperates (which occurs with probability  $\left[ \sum_{x=m+1}^n \binom{n}{x} \alpha^x (1-\alpha)^{n-x} \right]$ ), the utility difference is  $R - \left[ T - \frac{n}{2n-1} \rho(T-S) \right]$ . Therefore, the expressions that appear after parameter  $\lambda$  in the RHS of (14) are simply the difference in  $ij$ 's expected utilities generated by her actions C and D given the behavior of others.

Lemma 1 summarizes key properties of the logistic quantal response function  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  that are important for subsequent results.

### Lemma 1

The logistic quantal response function of the IPD, given by  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  in (14), possesses the following properties:

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<sup>9</sup> Note that the symmetric logistic quantal response function  $g(\alpha, \lambda, \rho, \sigma, P, R, S, T)$  is represented in various simpler forms in this paper, such as  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  in (14), as well as  $g(\alpha, \lambda, \rho)$  and  $g(\alpha, \lambda, \sigma)$  in (A16) in Appendix A, depending on the context.

(P1)  $g(\alpha, 0) = 0.5$  for all  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ .

(P2)  $g(0, \lambda) = g(1, \lambda) = 0.5$  for all  $\lambda > 0$ .

(P3) If condition (6) holds, then  $g(\alpha, \lambda) < 0.5$  for all  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  and  $\lambda > 0$ . Otherwise, when  $\lambda > 0$ ,  $g(\alpha, \lambda) < 0.5$  for  $0 < \alpha < q^*$ ,  $g(q^*, \lambda) = 0.5$ , and  $g(\alpha, \lambda) > 0.5$  for  $q^* < \alpha < 1$ , where  $q^*$  is defined in (10).

(P4) If condition (6) holds, then  $\frac{\partial g(\alpha, \lambda)}{\partial \lambda} < 0$  for all  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ . Otherwise,  $\frac{\partial g(\alpha, \lambda)}{\partial \lambda} < 0$  for  $0 < \alpha < q^*$ ,  $\frac{\partial g(q^*, \lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial g(\alpha, \lambda)}{\partial \lambda} > 0$  for  $q^* < \alpha < 1$ .

When  $\lambda = 0$ , a player is completely insensitive to the differences in expected utility between playing C and D and will play each strategy with equal probability. Thus, (P1) in Lemma 1 states that when  $\lambda = 0$ , the logistic quantal response function is the horizontal line  $g(\alpha, 0) = 0.5$ . When  $\lambda > 0$ , the probability that a player is pivotal,  $\binom{2m}{m} \alpha^m (1-\alpha)^m$ , equals zero when  $\alpha = 0$  or  $\alpha = 1$ . If everyone else always chooses C ( $\alpha = 1$ ) or always chooses D ( $\alpha = 0$ ), then a player will not be pivotal and hence will be indifferent between C and D. As a result, her quantal response will be given by  $g(0, \lambda) = g(1, \lambda) = 0.5$  in (P2). Property (P3) says that if others cooperate with a probability less (resp. larger) than  $q^*$ , then by definition of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, a player gets a higher (resp. lower) utility by playing D instead of C, according to (A9) (resp. (A10)) in Appendix A. Thus, a player's quantal response is to cooperate with a probability less (resp. larger) than 0.5. Property (P4) means that an increase in  $\lambda$  causes  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  to shift downward when  $\alpha < q^*$ , but causes  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  to shift upward when  $\alpha > q^*$ . Intuitively, as a player becomes more sensitive to the utility differences of the strategies, she will choose the better response with a higher probability.

Figure 2 illustrates these properties, using the same parameters as in Figure 1. The similarities and differences of the four diagrams on the left-hand side of Figure 2 follow from the general properties of  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  in Lemma 1. When condition (7), (8) or (9) holds, a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  will intersect 0.5 at three points:  $\alpha = 0$ ,  $q^*$  and 1. Moreover, when  $\lambda > 0$ ,  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  is below 0.5 and decreases in  $\lambda$  when  $\alpha < q^*$ , always equals 0.5 at  $q^*$ , and is above 0.5 and increases in  $\lambda$  when  $\alpha > q^*$ . These properties are seen in panels (b) to (d) of Figure 2. Under condition (6), a pivotal




Figure 2: Logit Equilibrium

player always prefers D to C and mixed-strategy equilibrium does not exist. The behavior of  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  under condition (6) is qualitatively similar to  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  in the interval  $[0, q^*]$  under condition (7), (8) or (9).

Now we consider the logit equilibrium, which is determined by the intersection of the logistic quantal response function  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  and the 45-degree line. Consider how the logit equilibrium correspondence  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  varies with the precision parameter  $\lambda$ . McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) showed that the logit equilibrium correspondence is a singleton when  $\lambda$  is sufficiently small, but generally contains multiple values when  $\lambda$  becomes higher. They further show that the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence contains a unique branch which starts at the centroid (with  $\lambda = 0$ , at which players' behavior is completely random) and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium. Turocy (2005) calls this unique branch the principal branch.

Building on these existing results, we present additional results regarding the logit equilibrium correspondence of the IPD. They are given in Proposition 2.<sup>10</sup>

**Proposition 2.**

(a) When condition (6) holds, the range of the logit equilibrium correspondence  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  is  $[0, 0.5]$ .

(b) When condition (7) holds, the range of  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  is  $[0, 0.5] \cup [q^*, 1]$ .

(c) When condition (9) holds, the range of  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  is  $[0, q^*] \cup [0.5, 1]$ .

Since the behavior of  $g(\alpha, \lambda)$  differs for the 4 different conditions, it is not surprising that the logit equilibrium correspondence  $\alpha^*(\lambda) = g(\alpha^*(\lambda), \lambda)$  also differs with respect to these regions. Proposition 2 states that  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  cannot exist in the interval  $(0.5, 1]$  under condition (6), in the interval  $(0.5, q^*)$  under condition (7), and in the interval  $(q^*, 0.5)$  under condition (9). To see, for example, why  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  cannot exist in the interval  $(0.5, q^*)$  under condition (7), note that under condition (7), for every  $\alpha \in (0.5, q^*)$ , the agent prefers playing D to playing C. Since an agent better responds under the logistic quantal response function,  $g(\alpha, \lambda) < 0.5 < \alpha$ , and  $\alpha \in (0.5, q^*)$  cannot be a logit equilibrium. These

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<sup>10</sup> Note that either condition (7) or (9) covers condition (8) in the limit. Thus, we do not state explicitly the range of  $\alpha^*(\lambda)$  under condition (8) in Proposition 2.



results show that the logit equilibrium imposes refutable restrictions regarding the agents' behavior in the IPD.<sup>11</sup>

### 3.4 Principal path of the logit equilibrium correspondence

Proposition 2 provides testable implications regarding the equilibrium probability of playing C ( $\alpha^*$ ) in the IPD. However, the range of possible value of  $\alpha^*$  is still quite large, since the precision parameter  $\lambda$  can take any non-negative value. The predictions of Proposition 2 are not very sharp, unless there are good reasons to pin down the value of  $\lambda$ . Another problem also arises even if the precision parameter can be narrowed down. As observed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) as well as the proof of Proposition 2, the logit equilibrium correspondence for sufficiently large values of  $\lambda$  are multi-valued. In order to derive sharper predictions, we need to develop arguments to select an equilibrium path.

McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Theorem 3) showed that the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence contains a unique branch which starts at the centroid and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium. In the following analysis, we focus on this unique principal branch for the following reasons. First, for any parameter profile  $(\rho, \sigma; P, R, S, T)$  that describes the material payoffs and social preferences of the agents, when (7), (8), or (9) holds the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence has multiple branches.<sup>12</sup> However, all branches other than the principal branch only exist when  $\lambda$  is larger than a strictly positive threshold value. On the other hand, the principal branch is the only branch that will generate a prediction for any logit precision parameter  $\lambda \geq 0$ . Second, Turocy (2005, Theorem 7) showed that in a symmetric  $2 \times 2$  game with two strict Nash equilibria, the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium when  $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$ . We shall show that a similar result holds in this IPD with group-contingent social preferences played by  $2n$  players.<sup>13</sup> Earlier research regarding equilibrium selection for pure coordination games suggests that while no selection criterion can fully explain observed behavior, risk dominance does have significant explanatory power (Camerer, 2003, chapter 7). Because of these two reasons, we focus on the principal path when the logit equilibrium correspondence has multiple branches.

Based on Proposition 2, we can derive the following features about the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence. Since this branch is defined for all  $\lambda \geq 0$  and starts at the centroid

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<sup>11</sup> The theoretical propositions—like propositions regarding how parameters concerning risk attitudes can affect economic behavior—involve social preference parameters and the logit precision parameter that are not directly observable to researchers. Our study is not designed to estimate these parameters. If one is interested in estimating these parameters, one can consider a design in which subjects play a large number of IPDs with different material payoffs.

<sup>12</sup> McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Theorem 2) showed that each branch of the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence converges to a Nash equilibrium when  $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$ .

<sup>13</sup> In the IPD studied in this paper, if D (resp. C) is a player's best reply when every other player chooses C with probability 0.5, then Everyone Defects (resp. Everyone Cooperates) is the risk dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).

( $\alpha^* = 0.5$  for our IPD with 2 possible actions), we conclude that it is (a) always in the interval  $[0, 0.5]$  under condition (6) or (7), (b) always equals to 0.5 under condition (8), and (c) always in the interval  $[0.5, 1]$  under condition (9).

In the following proposition, we further show that the principal branch converges monotonically to the risk dominant outcome.

**Proposition 3.**

As  $\lambda$  increases from 0, the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence of the IPD, which starts from  $\alpha_{prin}^*(0) = 0.5$ ,

(a) decreases monotonically in  $\lambda$  and converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium that Everyone Defects (i.e.,  $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow \infty} \alpha_{prin}^*(\lambda) = 0$ ), when condition (6) or (7) holds;

(b) is always at  $\alpha_{prin}^* = 0.5 = q^*$ , when condition (8) holds;

(c) increases monotonically in  $\lambda$  and converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium that Everyone Cooperates (i.e.,  $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow \infty} \alpha_{prin}^*(\lambda) = 1$ ), when condition (9) holds.

These results are illustrated in Figure 3(a). We again consider  $(P, R, S, T) = (54, 132, 28, 162)$ , and  $\sigma$  fixed at the value of  $-0.112$ . In Figure 3(a),  $\rho_{ab}$  and  $\rho_{bc}$  are the values of  $\rho$  such that conditions (6) and (8) hold with equality, respectively. The implication of Proposition 3 is that, if agents always play the IPD according to the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence, then as the logit precision parameter  $\lambda$  increases, the probability of choosing C ( $\alpha_{prin}^*$ ) will become closer to the equilibrium rate of cooperation--which equals either zero or one--given by the risk-dominant equilibrium.

**3.5 Comparative static results**

We now derive comparative static predictions on the player's equilibrium probability of choosing C ( $\alpha_{prin}^*$ ) in the IPD with group-contingent social preferences and bounded rationality. For example, one may want to predict what happens to  $\alpha_{prin}^*$ , when  $\rho$  increases (an increase in an agent's charitable concerns for out-group members). For these comparative static results we suppose that agents always play according to the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence.




Figure 3: Equilibrium  $\alpha$  (Principal Branch) against  $\lambda$  and  $\rho$

First, we consider the prediction of the model when the logit precision parameter ( $\lambda$ ) remains unchanged. This is given by the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.**

An increase in the pro-social concerns for out-group members (i.e., either an increase in charitable or envious parameter) increases the players' probability of choosing C, at each level of the precision parameter. That is, for  $\lambda > 0$ ,

$$\frac{\partial \alpha_{prin}^*}{\partial \rho} > 0. \tag{15}$$

$$\frac{\partial \alpha_{prin}^*}{\partial \sigma} > 0. \tag{16}$$

The monotonicity result in (15) can be observed in Figure 3(b), where we plot  $\alpha_{prin}^*$  versus  $\rho$ , when all other parameters (including  $\lambda$ ) remain unchanged for each path.

Proposition 4 implies that if a successful prior interaction makes individuals more charitable to or less envious of their out-group, other things being equal, it will increase individuals' probability of cooperation in equilibrium. Changing preferences towards the out-group has the following effects. First, an increase in an individual's concerns for her out-group increases the utility difference between Cooperate and Defect. As implied by the quantal response function in (14), even if other individuals' probability of cooperation does not change, at every level of the precision parameter ( $\lambda$ ) the individual will now cooperate with a higher probability. Second, in equilibrium, an individual correctly expects that increased pro-social concerns cause both members of her group and her out-group to cooperate with a higher probability. That is, she "trusts" that both her members of her group and her out-group are more likely to cooperate.

In short, the successful prior interaction increases the equilibrium probability of cooperation because each individual is now responding to a higher probability of cooperation by all other players and is also picking her (better) response to this higher probability of cooperation on a "higher" quantal response function. The model shows that taking into account the implications of decision errors and preference shocks can be important in this environment when subjects only play the IPD once. In the presence of bounded rationality, if successful prior interaction increases individuals' concerns for the welfare of their out-group members, then individuals will expect (or "trust") that other players are more likely to cooperate in the IPD, and they will cooperate more in equilibrium. Our experimental design allows us to gather empirical evidence regarding how successful prior interaction affects the following three variables in the subsequent IPD: cooperation rates, individuals' concerns for the welfare of their out-group and their beliefs about how likely others will cooperate.

Proposition 4 is a comparative static result when  $\lambda$  is held constant. This result is relevant if a change in the parameter does not affect the logistic precision parameter. Now we turn to a stronger prediction of the model, irrespective of the level of  $\lambda$ . An exogenous change (such as through a treatment manipulation in an experiment) that is strong enough to change the IPD from the region of (6) or (7) to the region of (9), leads to the following corollary.

**Corollary.**

Suppose that there is an exogenous change in agents' pro-social concerns for the out-group that shifts the IPD under condition (6) or (7) to one under condition (9). This change causes the probability of

choosing C to increase from a value below 0.5 to a value above 0.5, irrespective of the value of the precision parameter ( $\lambda$ ) in both treatments, provided that  $\lambda > 0$ .

#### 4. Experimental Design and Procedures

The experiment studies the IPD played by two groups of three members each, with the material payoffs given in Table 3.

		Group 2	
		Cooperate	Defect
Group 1	Cooperate	132, 132	28, 162
	Defect	162, 28	54, 54

**Table 3: Material Payoffs (in HK\$) of the IPD Experiment (HK\$7.80≈US\$1.00)**

The experiment included three treatments. Twelve independent groups of six subjects participated in each treatment, for a total of 216 subjects. The timeline below summarizes each experimental treatment and highlights the differences between the treatments. Subjects read the instructions for a particular task (which were also read aloud by an experimenter) at the beginning of each task.

Experiments in psychology and economics have induced group identity in a variety of ways, such as through classification of artwork preferences (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009), or by allowing subjects to help in-group members in answering quiz questions (e.g., Morita and Servátka, 2013). In our study all treatments began with a simple minimum effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990) to build initial group identity. As indicated in the experimental instructions in Appendix B, subjects could earn HK\$19.50 by coordinating on the maximum integer (7) or as little as HK\$10.50 by coordinating on the minimum integer (1). Since the goal of this task was to build group identity we wanted the subjects to be able to solve this coordination problem. Therefore, we allowed them to send a non-binding proposed choice followed by anonymous chat communication for two minutes before they were required to submit their final choice. This led to successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium of integer 7 by 65 of the 72 groups. Since essentially all subjects chose the highest number 7 on this coordination task, we do not have variation in coordination game behavior to relate to subsequent cooperation choices. Results and earnings from this preliminary game were displayed immediately to subjects.

In the Baseline treatment the groups then proceeded directly to the IPD, with payoffs (per player) shown in the right-hand panel of Table 3 paid in HK\$. As in the minimum effort game, in the IPD

considered in the Baseline and all other treatments, subjects first made a non-binding proposed choice and then engaged in a private, 3-player chat (this time for three minutes). The group’s choice to defect or cooperate in the IPD was determined by majority vote. This design allows us to use the natural language classification game introduced in Houser and Xiao (2011) to examine the chats to investigate, among other issues, whether success in prior interactions increases individuals’ concerns for the welfare of their out-group members.

Before results of the IPD were shown, subjects submitted beliefs individually indicating their subjective likelihood that the other group voted in every possible way (3 Cooperate & 0 Defect, 2 C & 1 D, 1 C & 2 D, and 3 D). They were paid (up to HK\$20) for accuracy based on a quadratic scoring rule.<sup>14</sup> Subjects also completed a simple risk assessment task and completed a post-experiment survey.

Baseline (in all treatments)	Added for Inter-group Coordination	Added for Inter-group Coord- ination+Communication
Task 1: 3-player minimum effort game (with chat) to build group identity	Task 2: 6-player minimum effort game (with chat among 6 players)	Task 2: 6-player minimum effort game (with chat among 6 players)  3 chat communication phases before IPD: 3-player groups, all 6 players (both groups), again only 3-player groups
Task 3: Inter-group prisoner’s dilemma played between 3-player groups (always preceded by 3-player chats)		
Task 4: Incentivized belief elicitation about other group’s IPD voting		
Post-experiment survey, risk preference assessment and demographic questionnaire		

The other two treatments added an inter-group coordination task prior to the IPD, which may affect an agent’s social preferences towards the other group. In the language of our model, the conjecture is that coordination success in this prior inter-group coordination game could raise  $\rho$  and/or  $\sigma$ . This

<sup>14</sup>The quadratic scoring rule is incentive compatible (Savage, 1971), and since subjects did not learn about this task until after the IPD was completed, it could not have affected their choices in the IPD.

coordination game was similar to the initial 3-player minimum effort coordination game, except this time played by all 6 players on both groups. We again allowed subjects to send a non-binding proposed choice and then permitted anonymous chat communication for two minutes before they submitted their final choice. This led to successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium of 7 by every one of the 36 groups. Results and earnings from this inter-group coordination game were displayed immediately to subjects. Importantly, this coordination game involving members from both groups occurs before subjects were informed that they would be playing an IPD. This kind of prior social interaction that took place *before* the game of interest differs from *in game* interactions that occurred after subjects have begun interacting in the game of interest—for example, communication between subjects when they are playing the prisoner’s dilemma—that have been widely studied by economists.<sup>15</sup>

To focus on the “pure effect” of prior social interaction, our second treatment only added the coordination game prior to the IPD. If groups have the opportunity to interact prior to engage in interactions resembling the IPD, however, they are also likely to have the opportunity to communicate with one another when they are playing the IPD. Our third treatment added communication between groups after they learned about the IPD. Following an initial 3-minute private chat among the 3 group members, a larger 6-player chat occurred for both groups, also for 3 minutes. This was followed by another private 3-player chat opportunity for group members and then the usual voting for cooperation or defection in the IPD.

Subjects were recruited from classes, through e-mail and posted announcements around the University of Hong Kong and they signed up using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). No subject participated in more than one session. Two 6-person groups were conducted simultaneously, which helped maintain anonymity regarding group membership in the lab. The experimental software was written in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). To ensure greater understanding about all aspects of the instructions and the tasks subjects had to complete, tasks 1, 2 and 3 included paid, computerized quizzes immediately following the reading of those instructions. Subjects were paid HK\$2 for each correct quiz answer, and could earn up to HK\$32 in total. (Any incorrect response provided a clarification for that question, based on text from the instructions.) Task understanding was excellent, since subjects scored 94.4% correct on average, and 106 of the 216 subjects scored 100% correct. Sessions required approximately 90 minutes to complete, and average earnings were HK\$163.52 each, with an inter-quartile range of HK\$115 to HK\$231.

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<sup>15</sup> Sally’s (1995) survey discusses how changing different aspects of the social dilemma itself affects cooperation, with emphasis on the effects of adding communication to the social dilemma itself.

## 5. Experimental Results

Table 4 summarizes the experiment outcomes. Success in the inter-group coordination game has a large impact on individual decisions to cooperate in the IPD. This 5-fold increase in cooperation, from 8.3% to 44.4%, is highly statistically significant.<sup>16</sup> Without any inter-group interaction before the IPD, the outcome (Defect, Defect) is by far the most common, but it decreases to only one-quarter of all outcomes in the inter-group coordination treatment. This change in group-level outcomes is also highly significant (Fisher’s exact test  $p$ -value=0.012). Similarly, inter-group coordination significantly increases payoffs ( $p$ -value<0.01).

Adding inter-group communication raises cooperation above the level observed in the intermediate inter-group coordination treatment, both at the individual and group level (one-tailed  $p$ -values<0.05). As seen in the fifth row, the increase in the (Cooperate, Cooperate) group outcome frequency from 1 to 5 is also statistically significant, but only marginally for this sample size (Fisher’s exact test one-tailed  $p$ -value=0.077). Profit earned from the IPD also increases significantly, from 88 to 107, when communication is introduced (one-tailed  $p$ -value<0.05).

Treatment:	Baseline	Intergroup Coordination	Intergroup Coordination+Communication
Individuals Voting to Cooperate	6/72 (8.3%)	32/72 (44.4%)	49/72 (68.1%)
Groups Cooperating	2/24 (8.3%)	10/24 (41.7%)	16/24 (66.7%)
(Defect, Defect) Outcomes	10	3	1
(Cooperate, Defect) Outcomes	2	8	6
(Cooperate, Cooperate) Outcomes	0	1	5
Average IPD Payoffs	60.8	87.8	107.0
Average Belief Other Group Cooperates	0.23	0.46	0.69

**Table 4: Summary of Experiment Outcomes**

Both the chat room content and the post-experiment survey provide supporting evidence that coordination success in the coordination game prior to the IPD increases the concerns for the welfare of

<sup>16</sup> Individual votes to defect or cooperate are not statistically independent, and votes across teams are also not independent in the inter-group coordination treatments because of the prior interaction in the coordination game. Therefore, to test for treatment effects we estimate a probit model of the binary decision to cooperate, with estimated standard errors that are robust to unmodelled correlation across choices within sessions. Coefficient estimates on a dummy variable for the inter-group coordination treatment are highly significant ( $p$ -value<0.01). Other statistical tests reported in the text are based on similar modeling of the error structure to account for correlation, except for nonparametric tests which are only conducted on statistically-independent, session-level observations.



the other group. In order to quantify the chat room content, we recruited an additional 34 University of Hong Kong undergraduate students from the same subject pool who had not participated in the earlier experiment. They attended one of two “coding sessions” with 17 subjects in each. These sessions implemented the natural language classification game introduced in Houser and Xiao (2011). In each session the subjects read the chat room communications from all three treatments and half of the experimental sessions, and were asked to indicate whether certain goals or attitudes were expressed by group members. The coders also indicated what they thought the group would choose, and judged, based on chat communication, what the group believed their counterpart group would choose. We employed a coordination game in order to give subjects incentives to provide accurate evaluations of the qualitative chat data: In addition to a fixed participation payment these subjects earned up to HK\$120 for six randomly drawn responses, through a HK\$20 bonus for each question and chat room where their own classification matches the most popular classification in their session.

We assessed the reliability of this coding procedure using Cohen’s Kappa (Krippendorff, 2003; Cohen, 1960). The most reliably coded information concerns predictions about whether groups will defect (which correlates almost perfectly with actual defection decisions), as well as the groups’ beliefs about the cooperation choice of the other group (which is quite similar to the elicited beliefs summarized at the bottom of Table 4 above). This content analysis also reveals that groups usually predict correctly when their counterpart group will actually defect, with successful prediction rates of 66% in the coordination+communication treatment and 87% in the other two treatments.

Although it does not quite reach the “moderate” reliability threshold of 0.4 for Cohen’s Kappa, we do see systematic variation across treatment in the response to the following coding question: “Did any member of this group indicate a goal of earning as much money as possible for all six players in the cluster group?” The coders indicated that this goal was expressed by 36% of the baseline groups, 45% of the inter-group coordination groups, and 57% of the coordination+communication groups. This provides support for the idea that successful prior interaction affects the players’ objectives and attitudes towards the other group.

The post-experiment survey provides further evidence that the change in cooperation rates across treatments is due to changes in subjects’ self-reported objectives. The top half of Table 5 shows that the fraction of subjects who stated an objective to earn as much as possible for their group decreased relative to the baseline when inter-group coordination or coordination+communication was introduced ( $p$ -value $<0.01$  for both pairwise comparisons). The fraction who stated an objective to earn as much as possible for all six people in the group increased across treatments (one-tailed  $p$ -value=0.028 for Baseline to Inter-group Coordination comparison;  $p$ -value $<0.01$  for Inter-group Coordination to Coordination+Communication comparison).

The comparative static results of our model suggest that if successful prior interaction increases individuals' concerns for their out-group, then individuals will expect that others are more likely to cooperate. Consistent with this prediction, beliefs also change across treatments in a systematic way, consistent with actual cooperation rates. The average belief that the other group will cooperate doubles from the baseline to the inter-group coordination treatment ( $p$ -value $<0.01$ ), and increases by the exact same percentage when adding communication ( $p$ -value $<0.01$ ).

Question: "In Task III, when you voted, how would you describe the strategies you used? Please select all that apply."

Treatment:	Baseline	Inter-group Coordination	Inter-group Coordination + Communication
"I tried to earn as much money as possible for me and my two teammates."	51/72 (70.8%)	38/72 (52.8%)	23/72 (31.9%)
"I tried to earn as much money as possible for all six people in my cluster group."	14/72 (19.4%)	25/72 (34.7%)	44/72 (61.1%)

Question: "Generally speaking, would you say the people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"

Fraction Responding "Usually not trusted"	Encountered a Cooperating Group	Encountered a Defecting Group
Member of a Cooperating Group	1/36 (2.8%)	11/48 (22.9%)
Member of a Defecting Group	17/48 (35.4%)	17/84 (20.2%)

**Table 5: Selected Post-Experiment Questionnaire Responses**

The post-experiment survey also included a standard "general trust" question from the World Values Survey ([worldvaluessurvey.org](http://worldvaluessurvey.org)), as shown in the bottom half of Table 5. A majority of subjects (150 out of 216) indicated that others can be "Usually trusted." The table shows an interesting pattern that emerged, however, among the 46 individuals who indicated that others can be "Usually not trusted." Not surprisingly, individuals who cooperated but encountered a defecting group were much more likely to indicate that others cannot be trusted ( $p$ -value $<0.01$ ). Members of defecting teams' responses were also correlated with the choice made by their paired group. Surprisingly, however, those who interacted with a cooperating group reported a *greater* lack of trust in others ( $p$ -value=0.038). We conjecture that this correlation may reflect that those who harm the other (cooperating) group are engaging in ex post rationalization of their defection choice.

## 6. Conclusions

Motivated by the widely-held belief that prior interactions can significantly affect inter-group cooperation, this paper develops a simple, tractable model of how changes in individuals' concerns for their out-group affect cooperation in the IPD. We then report novel experimental findings showing that success in a prior inter-group coordination game increase individuals' concerns for the welfare of their out-group, and increase cooperation and individuals' beliefs about how likely others will cooperate in a subsequent IPD.

Given the importance of other inter-group social dilemmas such as inter-group public good games that involve continuous choices, it is natural to investigate whether successful prior interactions have similar effects on inter-group social dilemmas other than the IPD. Furthermore, our focus in this paper is on success, rather than failure, of prior interaction. It is important to investigate empirically whether and when failures in prior interaction decrease individuals' concerns for their out-group and reduce cooperation in the IPD or other games. In particular, if research finds that a particular failed prior interaction has such negative effects, then it will be useful to find out whether and when some *offsetting successful prior interactions* that occurred after the failed prior interaction but before the IPD can sufficiently increase individuals' concerns for their out-group to enable the interacting groups to achieve significant cooperation in the IPD.

We believe our theoretical analysis also contributes to the understanding of the prior interaction hypothesis. None of the small number of existing studies in the IPD in economics discussed in Section 2 develops a theoretical model to study how individuals make decisions in the IPD and use the model to derive testable implications. Chen and Li (2009) use a model with homogenous preferences of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) to inform their experimental study about individual decisions in allocation tasks and two-person sequential games. We adapt their model to the IPD and allow for decision errors and preferences shocks, and further develop comparative static results and test them in the experiments. While the assumption of homogenous preferences is a good starting point, it would be helpful in future analysis to see whether further interesting implications can be obtained when the model is extended to allow for heterogeneous preferences. Another important limitation of the current analysis is its “reduced form” formulation. The tractable model developed in this study allows us to trace how changes in individuals' concerns for their out-group as a result of successful prior interaction—for example, an increase in  $\rho$  or  $\sigma$ —affect their beliefs and cooperation decisions in equilibrium, while taking into account pivotal decision-making and bounded rationality. The analysis, however, does not address how the effect of prior interaction on social preferences itself may depend on the nature of the prior interaction—for example, whether the prior interaction is a coordination game or a mixed-motive game such as an IPD with a “smaller stake.”

For example, suppose that the target interaction is again an IPD-like situation but with “high” stakes. Consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, the failed prior interaction is an IPD-like situation. In the second scenario, the failed prior interaction is a coordination-game-like situation involving these two groups that has negligible conflict of interest, and has a stake smaller than the IPD prior interaction in the first scenario. Failure in the IPD prior interaction in scenario one means that individuals have been cheated by their out-group. In contrast, if individuals experience a failure in the coordination game prior interaction in scenario two, they will suffer disappointment due to the coordination failure, but may not have as strong a feeling of being cheated compared to the case when they experience a failure in the IPD prior interaction in scenario two. In addition, a failure in the first scenario will cause a larger loss. Both effects suggest that if some form of offsetting interactions can still promote inter-group cooperation in the target IPD, then to achieve the same level of cooperation in the target interaction, a “stronger” offsetting interaction will be necessary in the first scenario than in the second scenario.

Progress in operationalizing and understanding this conjecture and similar questions requires going beyond our current reduced form model to investigate theoretically how the required successful offsetting interactions depend on the nature of the target interaction and the failed prior interaction. Such richer theoretical work can generate predictions and guide further empirical work ranging from laboratory experiments to field experiments and econometric analysis of naturally occurring data.

Studying the effects of prior interactions on inter-group cooperation requires consideration of the role of non-economic motivations and how their endogenous changes affect inter-group interactions. This study, as well as the related literature discussed in Section 2, illustrate that these issues can be analyzed using the standard tools of economics.<sup>17</sup> A deeper understanding of the implications of prior interactions will require iterative dialogues between theories, laboratory experiments, field experiments, and analysis of naturally occurring data. Such careful iterative dialogues should eventually generate useful insights for policy makers and organizational designers regarding the best possible forms of prior interactions that can increase inter-group cooperation for a specific target interaction given the existing context, and shed light on the resources needed for implementing the required prior interactions. Such research may also indicate whether the target interaction is too ambitious given the prior context and the resources available to cultivate prior interactions aiming at facilitating inter-group cooperation. If necessary, efforts can be devoted to formulating a more realistic immediate goal and finding ways to achieve it.

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<sup>17</sup> See Sobel (2005) and Tabellini (2008) for two recent thoughtful discussions regarding how non-economic motivations and their endogenous changes can be fruitfully studied using the standard tool of economic theory.

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