${\bf Table~1a} \\ {\bf (Robustness)~Event~study~of~stock~returns~surrounding~announcements~of~} Fortune~{\bf ranking~scores}$

This table presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated over various intervals surrounding the publication date of the ranking scores of *Fortune's* list of America's Most Admired Companies. The Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model is used to calculate CARs. All firm years are sorted into quintiles based on the change in ranking score and CARs are calculated for each group as well the firm's seeing the largest increase minus those seeing the largest decrease. Event intervals are in days except the bottom set which are in months (mo). T-statistics are in parentheses. T-statistics are adjusted for event day clustering.

Event Window	All	Winners (High)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Losers (Low)	Difference (High-Low)
[-21, -4]	-0.04%	0.10%	0.37%	0.23%	0.07%	0.76%	-0.66%
	[-0.74]	[0.44]	[1.98]	[1.21]	[0.28]	[2.58]	[-1.81]
[-3, +3]	0.06%	-0.73%	-0.16%	0.27%	0.26%	0.32%	-1.04%
	[0.88]	[-4.90]	[-1.12]	[2.44]	[1.93]	[2.78]	[-4.50]
[+4,+21]	0.08%	0.05%	0.23%	0.36%	0.43%	1.23%	-1.17%
	[1.19]	[1.39]	[1.13]	[2.16]	[1.90]	[4.61]	[2.23]
[+1M,+12M]	0.35%	0.16%	-0.82%	-0.32%	1.39%	1.38%	1.23%
	[0.59]	[0.12]	[-0.65]	[-0.27]	[1.08]	[0.90]	[0.60]

Table 2a

(Robustness) Event study of stock returns surrounding announcements of Fortune ranking scores

This table presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated over various intervals surrounding the publication date of the ranking scores of *Fortune's* list of America's Most Admired Companies. The difference column presents the CAR statistic of firms experiencing an increase in score ($\Delta Score > 0$) minus the CAR statistic of firms experiencing a decrease in score ($\Delta Score < 0$). Panel A calculates the CARs using the market model. Panel B calculates the CARs using market adjusted returns (market model with restriction that α =0 and β =1).Panel C sorts firms into winners and losers based on changes in firms rank within their industry rather than changes in score. Panel D excludes all observations in which there is a story about the firm on Dow Jones Newswires in the window from 10 days before until 10 days after the publication of the rankings. Panels C and D calculate CARs using the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model. Event intervals are in days except the bottom set which are in months (M). T-statistics are in parentheses. T-statistics are adjusted for event day clustering.

Panel A. Market Model

Event Window	A 11	Winners	Losers	Difference
Event window	All	(W)	(L)	(W-L)
[-21, -4]	0.15%	0.22%	0.09%	0.13%
	[2.26]	[2.56]	[0.85]	[0.97]
[-3, +3]	0.03%	-0.12%	0.70%	-0.82%
	[0.78]	[-2.51]	[7.34]	[-6.58]
[+4,+21]	0.23%	-0.28%	0.19%	-0.47%
	[3.42]	[-3.00]	[1.88]	[-2.88]
[+1M,+12M]	2.17%	1.65%	2.67%	1.02%
	[5.15]	[3.27]	[4.78]	[1.35]

Panel B. Market Adjusted Model

Event Window	A 11	Winners	Losers	Difference
Event window	All	(W)	(L)	(W-L)
[-21, -4]	0.08%	0.17%	0.00%	0.17%
	[1.23]	[2.03]	[0.04]	[-1.32]
[-3, +3]	0.04%	-0.31%	0.37%	-0.68%
	[0.63]	[-3.89]	[4.08]	[-5.61]
[+4,+21]	0.23%	-0.29%	0.16%	-0.45%
. , .	[3.33]	[-3.13]	[1.66]	[-0.96]
[+1M,+12M]	-0.06%	0.22%	-0.32%	0.54%
	[-0.41]	[0.41]	[-0.54]	[0.67]

Panel C. Change in Ranking

Event Window	All	Winners	Losers	Difference
Event window	All	(W)	(L)	(W-L)
[-21, -4]	-0.04%	0.12%	0.51%	-0.39%
	[-0.74]	[0.85]	[3.32]	[-1.91]
[-3, +3]	0.06%	-0.26%	0.26%	-0.52%
	[0.88]	[-2.78]	[2.93]	[-4.02]
[+4,+21]	0.08%	-0.42%	0.67%	-1.09%
	[1.19]	[-3.23]	[4.78]	[-2.29]
[+1M,+12M]	0.35%	-0.39%	1.15%	1.54%
	[0.59]	[-0.48]	[1.33]	[1.29]

Panel D. Change in Ranking Scores without Confounding Events

Event Window	All	Winners	Losers	Difference
Event window	All	(W)	(L)	(W-L)
[-21, -4]	0.42%	0.31%	0.52%	-0.21%
	[3.64]	[2.13]	[2.95]	[-0.90]
[-3, +3]	-0.05%	-0.37%	0.26%	-0.63%
	[-0.64]	[-3.59]	[2.59]	[-4.38]
[+4,+21]	0.62%	-0.39%	0.83%	-1.22%
[,.=-]	[5.56]	[-2.67]	[5.02]	[2.00]
[+1M,+12M]	0.75%	0.57%	0.92%	-0.35%
[[1.12]	[0.61]	[0.95]	[-0.26]

Table 3a (Robustness)Changes in *Fortune* ranking and ranking scores and changes in CEO compensation

Column 1 of his table presents the coefficients from a regression of the change in total CEO compensation on the change in *Fortune* ranking and measures of firm characteristics and performance. Column 2 of his table presents the coefficients from a regression of the change in total CEO compensation on the change in ranking score and measures of firm characteristics and performance, excluding all observations in which there is a story about the firm on Dow Jones Newswires in the window from 10 days before until 10 days after the publication of the rankings. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The intercept is not reported for brevity. Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	Coefficient l	Estimates
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)
ΔR ank	-0.015***	
	(-3.05)	
ΔScore		3.072***
		(3.49)
LgAssets	0.075	0.081
	(1.09)	(0.86)
Leverage	0.415	0.404
	(0.32)	(0.28)
Tobin's Q	0.243	0.238
	0.243	(0.32)
RD/Sales	-1.299	-0.151
	(-0.49)	(-0.04)
CAPX/Sales	2.077	-1.958
	(0.64)	(-1.17)
Advertising/Sales	-4.163	-2.979
	(-1.38)	(-0.86)
Industry-adjusted ROA	-0.058	-1.591
	(-0.02)	(-0.35)
1-year abnormal return	7.337***	7.419**
	(2.64)	(2.25)
Stock return volatility	-1.277*	-1.941*
	(-1.68)	(-1.90)
Firm age	-0.006*	-0.007*
	(-1.64)	(-1.65)
CEO tenure	0.005	-0.001
	(0.36)	(-0.07)
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes
Firm-clustered S.E.	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	5,811	4,409
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.011

Table 4a (Robustness) Changes in *Fortune* ranking and ranking scores and CEO turnover

This table presents coefficients from logit estimations in which the dependent variable of the model in column 1 and 3 is all CEO turnover and the dependent variable in columns 2 and 4 is involuntary CEO turnover. Columns 1 and 2 include the changes in *Fortune* ranking and measures of CEO characteristics and measures of performance as independent variables. Columns 3 and 4 include the changes in ranking scores and measures of CEO characteristics and measures of performance as independent variables, excluding all observations in which there is a story about the firm on Dow Jones Newswires in the window from 10 days before until 10 days after the publication of the rankings. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The intercept is not reported for brevity. Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	Coefficient Estimates						
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
(D.)	0.00 0 distrib	0.004 duduk					
Δ Rank	0.003***	0.001***					
	(3.57)	(2.14)					
ΔScore			-0.440***	-0.134**			
			(-3.84)	(-2.67)			
CEOTenure	-0.356***	-0.011	-0.306***	-0.005			
	(-8.00)	(-0.55)	(-7.92)	(-0.20)			
CEOAge	-0.046***	0.021	-0.042***	0.029			
	(-3.10)	(1.05)	(-2.62)	(1.08)			
CEO/Chair duality	-0.495***	-0.775***	-0.481**	-0.772**			
•	(-2.81)	(-2.91)	(-2.25)	(-2.03)			
pre-BHR	-0.286	-2.121***	-0.175	-2.338***			
	(-1.23)	(-3.75)	(-0.78)	(-3.56)			
post-BHR	-0.062	-0.715	-0.034	-0.200			
	(-0.31)	(-1.05)	(-0.16)	(-0.57)			
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Firm-clustered S.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Number of observations	5843	5760	4435	4226			
Pseudo R^2	0.228	0.089	0.212	0.092			

Table 5a (Robustness) Changes in *Fortune* ranking and ranking scores and acquisition activity

This table presents coefficients from logit and ordered logit estimations. Columns 1 and 3 present coefficients from a logit estimation in which the dependent variable is the acquisition indicator. Columns 2 and 4 present coefficients from an ordered logit estimation in which the dependent variable in the model is the number of acquisitions. Columns 1 and 2 include the changes in *Fortune* ranking and measures of firm characteristics as independent variables. Columns 3 and 4 include the changes in ranking scores and measures of firm characteristics as independent variables, excluding all observations in which there is a story about the firm on Dow Jones Newswires in the window from 10 days before until 10 days after the publication of the rankings. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The intercept is not reported for brevity. Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

		Coefficient I	Estimates	
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta Rank$	-0.001***	-0.001***		
	(-2.96)	(-3.67)		
Δ Score			0.170***	0.104***
			(3.41)	(3.46)
Leverage	-4.214***	-2.849***	-3.036***	-2.067***
	(-4.07)	(-4.63)	(-2.68)	(-3.90)
Leverage^2	4.655***	3.859***	2.573	2.457***
	(2.43)	(3.79)	(1.16)	(2.63)
Collateral	-2.991***	-1.552***	-2.991***	-1.401***
	(-9.17)	(-6.97)	(-8.72)	(-6.84)
NWC/Total assets	1.512***	0.681***	1.473***	0.445**
	(3.62)	(2.86)	(3.44)	(2.43)
Cash/Total assets	-1.639	-0.394	-1.396	-0.456
	(-1.48)	(-0.60)	(-1.22)	(-0.80)
(CAPX +RD)/Total assets	0.967	1.133*	0.606	0.214
	(1.59)	(1.82)	(0.93)	(0.64)
Asset growth	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.97)	(-1.50)	(-0.87)	(-1.28)
M/B	-0.176***	-0.011***	-0.206***	-0.009***
	(-3.59)	(-2.96)	(-3.62)	(-2.92)
LgAssets	0.249***	0.183***	0.205***	0.106***
-	(4.86)	(4.32)	(3.84)	(3.38)
High tech	0.571***	0.325*	0.398*	0.267**
-	(2.65)	(1.68)	(1.80)	(1.93)
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-clustered S.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	6003	6003	4688	4688
Pseudo R^2	0.085	0.081	0.078	0.056

Table 6a (Robustness) Changes in *Fortune* ranking and ranking scores and acquisition performance

This table presents coefficients of regressions of acquisition performance during the (approximately) 11 months following publication. In column 1 the dependent variable is the sum of an acquirer's CARs in acquisitions completed during the (approximately) 11 months following publication of the list. If a firm completes no acquisition during this period, the variable is set to zero. In column 2 of the dependent variable is the average of an acquirer's CARs in acquisitions completed during the (approximately) 11 months following publication of the list. If a firm completes no acquisition during this period, the variable is set to zero. In column 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the CAR of each acquisition completed during the (approximately) 11 months following publication of the list. Panel A includes the changes in Fortune ranking and measures of firm and acquisition characteristics as independent variables. Panel B includes the changes in ranking scores and measures of firm and acquisition characteristics as independent variables, excluding all observations in which there is a story about the firm on Dow Jones Newswires in the window from 10 days before until 10 days after the publication of the rankings. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The intercept is not reported for brevity. Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm in column 1 and 2 of panel B. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table 6a - Continued

Panel A. Change in Ranking

		Coefficien	t Estimates	
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔRank	0.000***	0.000*	0.003***	0.003**
·	(3.94)	(1.87)	(3.78)	(2.16)
LgAssets	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.209***	-0.215
	(-3.94)	(-4.68)	(-2.80)	(-1.47)
Tobin's Q	0.000*	0.000	0.023	0.087
	(1.73)	(1.57)	(0.40)	(0.98)
ROA	-0.005	-0.007*	0.473	0.141
	(-0.66)	(-1.82)	(0.33)	(0.06)
Leverage	0.008	0.003	1.638**	2.260
	(1.44)	(1.05)	(1.98)	(1.47)
Private				-0.514
				(-1.54)
Public				-1.135***
				(-2.60)
Diversifying				0.079
				(0.26)
Hostile takeover				0.549
				(0.80)
Tender offer				-1.652
				(-0.99)
Competing bidder				-1.041
1 0				(-0.92)
All Equity				-0.127
				(-0.27)
All Cash				0.191
				(0.61)
Relative size				2.742
				(0.97)
Year Fixed Effect	V	V	V.	Van
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Firm-clustered S.E.	No	No	Yes	Yes
rimi-clustered S.E.	Yes	Yes	No	No
Number of observations	7,686	7,686	5,440	1,744
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.003	0.020	0.060

Table 6a - Continued

Panel B. Change in Ranking Scores without Confounding Events

	Coefficient Estimates					
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
ΔScore	-0.005***	-0.001*	-0.881***	-0.720***		
Ascore	(-3.65)	(-1.89)	(-5.82)	(-2.82)		
LgAssets	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.228**	-0.143		
LgAssets	(-3.77)	(-4.58)	(-2.33)	(-0.76)		
Tobin's Q	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.080		
Toom's Q	(1.60)	(1.53)	(0.65)	(0.80)		
ROA	-0.000	-0.007	1.262	1.160		
KON	(-0.04)	(-1.52)	(0.71)	(0.38)		
Leverage	0.014**	0.006**	3.223***	4.739***		
Leverage	(2.05)	(2.38)	(3.15)	(2.57)		
Private	(2.03)	(2.36)	(3.13)	-0.426		
Tivate				(-1.04)		
Public				-1.213**		
Tublic				(-2.27)		
Diversifying				-0.270		
Diversitying				(-0.73)		
Hostile takeover				0.925		
Trostile takeover				(1.14)		
Tender offer				-1.523		
Tender offer				(-0.85)		
Competing bidder				-1.361		
competing blues				(-1.01)		
All Equity				-0.111		
All Equity				(-0.20)		
All Cash				0.210		
All Cash				(0.54)		
Relative size				1.342		
Relative Size				(0.42)		
				(0.42)		
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Industry Fixed Effect	No	No	Yes	Yes		
Firm-clustered S.E.	Yes	Yes	No	No		
Number of observations	7,686	7,686	3,977	1,342		
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.003	0.032	0.074		