Mergers: An Overview.

Forthcoming in The Economics of Corporate Governance and Mergers, Klaus Gugler and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, editors.

JEL codes : G14, G34, L11
Keywords : merger waves, mergers.

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The Goals of Antitrust and Competition Policy.

Working Paper 2007-003, Center for International Business Education and Research, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, July 2007; forthcoming in Wayne Dale Collins, editor, Issues in Competition Law and Economics, American Bar Association, 2007.

Abstract : U.S. antitrust policy and EC competition policy began at different times and in very different contexts. U.S. antitrust at first pursued multiple economic and political goals. Against a persistent, if cyclical, campaign that it was at best unnecessary and at worst absolutely harmful, antitrust developed first a reliance on competition in the sense of rivalry to promote good market performance and has lately moved to explicit welfare evaluation, in an economic sense, as a policy standard. How one ought to measure market performance (consumer welfare or net social welfare) remains a subject of discussion. Use of the economic welfare standard in the United States is, at this writing, characterized by judicial application that is inconsistent with mainstream economics. EC competition policy long relied on competition in the sense of rivalry to promote market integration and good market performance, the two goals being thought to be largely compatible. It is now in a time of transition, with the Directorate General for Competition and the European Courts moving toward explicit welfare evaluation as a basis for treating business conduct. There are some signs that enforcement agencies regard the market integration task as sufficiently far along to give it less weight, relative to promotion of good market performance, than in the past. Whether this approach will prevail, and whether European Courts will follow, remains to be seen.
JEL codes : L4, K2
Keywords : antitrust, competition policy.

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Publication Patterns in Four Industrial Economics Journals

My slides from the editors' roundtable, EARIE 2006, Amsterdam, 27 August 2006.

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"Equilibrium state aid in integrating markets" (joint with Paola Valbonesi).

B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8(1), Article 33, 2008.

Abstract : We present a model of the impact of state aid on equilibrium market structure and on market performance in an integrating market when the process of integration is driven by consumer inertia. In a partial equilibrium model, it is an equilibrium for governments to grant state aid, even though this reduces common market welfare.
JEL codes : F15, L11, L53
Keywords : state aid, exit, market integration.

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State aid to business, (joint with Paola Valbonesi) February 2006

Forthcoming in Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory, editors, International Handbook on Industrial Policy, Edward Elgar, 2006.
JEL codes :
Keywords : state aid, strategic trade policy, tax competition, rent seeking, state aid policy (US and EU).

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Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(6), November 2006, pp. 1299-1332.

Abstract : In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds, and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds).
JEL codes :
Keywords : competition policy, antitrust policy, collusion, tacit collusion.

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Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics, December 2005

Abstract : In this chapter I review the impact of antitrust ideology on the development of industrial economics.
JEL codes : B2, L0, L4
Keywords : antitrust, industrial economics, ideology.

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Coal and steel: first steps in European market integration , February 2004

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Globalization and the natural limits of competition March 2003.

Abstract : The chapter begins with a review of the different meanings that are given to the term "competition" in the economics literature. I follow this by a survey of empirical evidence on returns to scale, of the impact of actual and potential rivalry on productivity growth and on market structure, and draw implications for the benefits, in the sense of improved market performance, that may be expected to flow from globalization. A final consideration of policy restrictions on the market mechanism suggests that the greatest limitations to competition in global markets may lie in a political unwillingness to accept the resource reallocations that are part and parcel of the benefits following from globalization.
JEL codes : L11, F15, D24, O31
Keywords : competition; globalization; competition policy; innovation; market performance; organization; regulation.

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The evaluation of strategic research partnerships September 2002; forthcoming, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management

Abstract : Policy implications of strategic research alliances are analyzed, with emphasis on government-private sector cooperation, government support for private-sector innovation, and evaluation of such government programs.
JEL codes : O31
Keywords : innovation, strategic alliances.

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Sunk cost and entry Review of Industrial Organization 20(4) June 2002, pp. 291-304.

Abstract : The usual mechanisms by which sunk costs are said to affect entry are through raising the expected average cost of an entrant, relative to that of incumbents. I show that in standard models and in the absence of risk premia imposed by financial markets on an entrant's cost of capital, sunk costs may make entry unprofitable because of their effect on the post-entry unit costs of incumbents.
JEL codes : L40, O31, O38
Keywords : sunk cost, entry, entry barriers.

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Competition policy for high technology industries January 2000, revised March 2002; forthcoming, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

Abstract : I model optimal product-market competition policy when industries differ in the potential for quality-improving technological advance. In a two-period model, a competition authority with limited resources administers a deterrence-based competition policy toward two industries. In one of the industries, an incumbent firm chooses the level of resources to invest in a quality-improving R&D project. In the other industry, product quality is constant. Optimal policy requires the competition authority to administer a tougher competition policy before innovation, all else equal, the greater the potential quality improvement. I derive basic results for the case of one-time innovation, and extend them to the cases of sequential innovation and patent protection that confers limited antitrust immunity.
JEL codes : L40, O31, O38
Keywords : competition policy, innovation.

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Kreps & Scheinkman with product differentiation: an expository note July 1999 (revised April 2000)

Abstract : Kreps and Scheinkman's (1983) celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity reaction functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.
JEL codes : D43, L13
Keywords : capacity-constrained oligopoly, product differentiation.

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Spillovers, appropriability, and R&D Journal of Economics 75(1), 2002, pp. 1-32.

Abstract : I distinguish the impacts of input spillovers and imperfect appropriability of the revenue generated by cost-saving innovation in a racing model. Comparative static relationships with respect to the level of spillovers depend on the levels of post-innovation payoffs; comparative static relationships with respect to the degree of appropriability depend on changes in the levels of post-innovation payoffs. Simulations illustrate conditions under which private payoffs and net social welfare are maximized for positive spillover levels and incomplete appropriability. The main qualitative results of the basic model hold if it is extended to include endogenous absorptive capacity.
JEL codes : O31
Keywords : R&D spillovers, appropriability

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Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets (joint with Hans-Theo Normann and Christopher Snyder) Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 2001, pp. 466-96.

Abstract : We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, the upstream subject has more difficulty committing to supply the monopoly quantity in treatments with non-integration and secret contracts than in either treatments with integration or treatments with public contracts. Integration allows the upstream firm to extract a larger share of surplus than public contracts, a bargaining effect which has perhaps been underemphasized in the recent foreclosure literature. Motivated by a number of observations that are difficult to reconcile with existing theory, we extend the theory by allowing downstream subjects to have heterogeneous out-of-equilibrium beliefs (a mixture of passive and symmetric beliefs). The resulting model generates a number of surprising results about the structure of optimal contracts. We conclude with a comparison of our results to previous experiments on bargaining.
JEL codes : L12, L22, C90, D82
Keywords : vertical foreclosure, vertical contracts, bargaining.

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Resource allocation by a competition authority, in Einar Hope, editor, Foundations of Competition Policy Analysis. Routledge, 2000

Abstract : The paper develops a model of resource allocation by a competition authority that monitors market performance in several industries by setting threshold prices for each industry; observed prices above the threshold level trigger an investigation that leads, with a known probability, to prosecution, conviction, and a fine. The competition authority has a budget constraint. The implications of market size, demand elasticity, and seller concentration for enforcement decisions are examined.

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Strategic and welfare implications of bundling , Economics Letters, Volume 62, 1999, pp. 371-6.

Abstract : A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals' profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market.

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The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public support for private innovation (joint with John T. Scott) Research Policy 29(4-5), April 2000, pp. 437-47.

Abstract : We relate the sources of innovation market failure to the dominant mode of sectoral innovation and outline mechanisms for public support of innovation that target specific sources of innovation market failure.

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Product market competition policy and technological performance in George Norman and Jacques Thisse, editors, Market Structure and Competition Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 161-90.

Abstract : Stricter competition policy reduces expected payoffs before and after innovation, but reduces pre-innovation payoffs relatively more than post-innovation payoffs, and therefore increases the equilibrium level of R&D activity: tough product-market competition policy stimulates innovation. There is an inverted-U relationship between competition policy and expected welfare. The model also permits analysis of the effect of R&D spillovers and of alternative R&D cooperation regimes on expected welfare, on R&D efforts, and on the expected time to discovery of a cost-saving innovation.

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Competition policy: publicity vs. prohibition & punishment , in Competition Policies in Europe Stephen Martin (editor). Elsevier-North Holland Publishers, 1998.

Abstract : A comparison of the consequences for market performance of publicity of anticompetitive behavior with prohibition of anticompetitive behavior combined with punishment of violators suggests that the former is likely to be ineffective.

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Experimental tests of consciously parallel behavior in oligopoly (joint with Ronald Harstad and Hans-Theo Normann) in Louis Phlips, editor, Applied Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Abstract: This research examines, in experimental oligopoly markets, (a) whether parallel pricing patterns emerge when communication among players is limited to cheap talk announcements; (b) whether such pricing patterns, if they emerge, lead to payoffs that exceed those players would receive in Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. Results indicate that announcements and price matching lead to larger price-cost margins than in static Nash equilibrium, while falling well short of joint profit maximization.

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Public policies toward cooperation in research and development: the European Community, Japan, the United States , in William Comanor, Akira Goto and Leonard Waverman, editors Competition Policy in a Global Economy, Routledge, 1996.

Abstract: A review of the economic literature on cooperative research and development, and a comparison of US policy with those of the European Community and Japan, do not provide a strong case for relaxed antitrust treatment of R & D and/or production joint ventures.

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R&D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion, European Journal of Political Economy Volume 11, Number 4, April 1996, pp. 733-741.

Abstract : It is shown that R & D joint ventures make it more likely that firms will be able to sustain tacit product-market collusion, all else equal.

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