

WILLIAM J. BROWN

CONTACT

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EDUCATION

Purdue University

Ph.D., Economics (<i>expected</i>)	2021
Committee: Tim Cason, Brian Roberson, Yaroslav Rosokha, Collin Raymond, Evan Calford	
M.S., Economics	2017
B.S., Economics	2016

Reutlingen ESB Business School

International Business and German Language	2014
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RESEARCH FIELDS

Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Political Economy, Behavioral Economics, Public Economics

WORKING PAPERS

“The Effect of Complexity in an Electorate: Experimental Evidence” (job market paper)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of complexity in various voting systems on individual behavior in small group electoral competitions. Using a laboratory experiment, I observe individual behavior within one of three voting systems -- plurality, instant runoff voting (IRV), and score then automatic runoff (STAR). I then estimate subjects' behavior in three different models of bounded rationality. The estimated models are a model of Level-K thinking (Nagel, 1995), the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model (Camerer, et al. 2004), and a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). I consistently find that more complex voting systems induce lower levels of strategic thinking. Models of limited strategic thinking (Level-K/CH) fit the data best and are consistent with the high frequency of sincere strategies observed in the data.

“The Effect of Leader Selection on Honesty and Group Performance: An Experimental Study” (With Brian Roberson and Raquel Asencio)

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between the mechanisms used to select leaders and both measures of group performance and leaders' ethical behavior. Using a laboratory experiment, we measure group performance in a group minimum effort task with without a leader selected using one of three mechanisms: random, a competition all-pay auction task, and voting. After the group task, leaders must complete a task that asks them to behave honestly or dishonestly in questions related to the group's performance. We find that leaders have a large impact on group performance when compared to those groups without leaders. Evidence for which selection mechanism performs best in terms of group performance seems mixed. On measures of honesty, both competition and voting selection outperform random selection, with some evidence suggesting that voting may produce the most honest leaders.

 SEMINAR, CONFERENCE, AND WORKSHOP PARTICIPATION

2020
 2020 ESA job-market candidate seminar series (scheduled)
 Purdue University

2019
 Purdue University
 Chapman University IFREE Graduate Student Workshop

2018
 Purdue University

 TEACHING EXPERIENCE AND AWARDS

Purdue University

Instructor

Introduction to Microeconomics (undergraduate, online) <i>Krannert Certificate for Distinguished Teaching</i>	Summer 2019
Game Theory (undergraduate) <i>Krannert Certificate for Distinguished Teaching</i>	Summer 2018
Principles of Economics (undergraduate, recitation) <i>Krannert Certificate for Outstanding Recitation Teaching</i>	Fall 2016

Teaching Assistant

Intermediate Macroeconomics (undergraduate)	Fall 2020
Bayesian Econometrics (PhD)	Fall 2020
Econometrics II (masters)	Summer 2020
Personnel Economics (masters)	Spring 2018
Game Theory (undergraduate)	Fall 2017
Introduction to Microeconomics (undergraduate)	Fall 2017

 SKILLS

Python, Stata, MATLAB, oTree, JavaScript, HTML, Microsoft SQL Server 2012/T-SQL

 NON-ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Campus Shift Lead, <i>Amazon.com</i> , West Lafayette, IN	2015-2016
IT Quality Specialist Intern, <i>IQVIA</i> , Indianapolis, IN	Summer 2013

 REFERENCES

Tim Cason Purdue University (765) 494-1737 cason@purdue.edu	Brian Roberson Purdue University (765) 494-4531 brobers@purdue.edu	Evan Calford Australian National University +61 2 612 51011 evan.calford@anu.edu.au	Yaroslav Rosokha Purdue University (765) 496-3668 yrosokha@purdue.edu
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