Associate Professor of Management
- Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Ran Zhao. Imitation in Product-Market Competition and Accounting Reporting. Journal of Management Accounting Research,
- Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Gaoqing Zhang (2019). Banks' Asset Reporting Frequency and Capital Regulation: An Analysis of Discretionary Use of Fair-Value Accounting. The Accounting Review, vol. 94 (2), 157-178.
- Mingcherng Deng, Lin Nan, and Xiaoyan Wen (2019). Information Quality and Endogenous Project Outcomes. Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 36 (2), 732-757.
- Lin Nan and Xiaoyan Wen (2019). Penalties, Manipulation, and Investment Efficiency. Management Science, vol. 65 (10), 4878-4900.
- Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Gaoqing Zhang (2019). The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk Taking.. Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 57 (5), 1161-1200.
- Jing Li, Lin Nan, and Ran Zhao. (2018). Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers. Review of Accounting Studies, vol. 23 (3), 1207-1240.
- Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Gaoqing Zhang (2015). Accounting Information Quality, Interbank Competition, and Bank Risk-Taking. The Accounting Review, vol. 90 (3), 967-985.
- Lin Nan and Xiaoyan Wen (2014). Financing and Investment Efficiency, Information Quality, and Accounting Biases. Management Science, vol. 60 (9), 2308-2323.
- Pierre Liang and Lin Nan (2014). Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention. European Accounting Review, vol. 23 (4), 693-727.
- Carlos Corona and Lin Nan (2013). Preannouncing Competitive Decisions in Oligopoly Markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 56 (1), 73-90.
- Guoming Lai, Laurens Debo, and Lin Nan (2011). Channel Stuffing with Short-Term Interest in Market Value. Management Science, vol. 57 (2), 332-346.
- Lin Nan (2011). An Unintended Consequence of SFAS 133: Promoting Speculation. Journal of Management Accounting Research, vol. 23 305-329.
- Lin Nan (2008). The Agency Problems of Hedging and Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 25 (3), 859-890.
Fouling Up: Can higher penalties encourage good companies to manipulate their financial reports?
In September 2018, Orlando-based SeaWorld Entertainment and its former CEO agreed to pay a penalty of more than $5 million to the Securities and Exchange Commission for misleading investors about the impact of the documentary film Blackfish on the company’s reputation and business. A study by accounting professors at Purdue’s Krannert School of Management and TCU’s Neeley School of Business finds that while penalties on companies for misconduct in financial reporting help to improve investment efficiency, increasing such penalties may induce entrepreneurs with good projects to offer rosier pictures of their prospects.
Downside of High Information Quality
Professor Lin Nan discusses her research on the downside of high information quality in accounting
The Krannert School of Management presented the fourth annual Purdue Accounting Theory Conference in May with a program that included distinguished guest speakers from across the country as well as rising scholars in the field. Accounting professors Mark Bagnoli, the Olson Chair in Management, and Susan Watts, the Emanuel T. Weiler Chair in Management, served as coordinators of the conference along with Associate Professor Lin Nan.
Quality, Competition, and Risk-Taking
Accounting Information Quality, Interbank Competition, and Bank Risk-Taking.
Phone: (765) 49-60551
Office: RAWL 4031
Area(s) of Expertise
Theoretical research in accounting